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1 Information on Hatf 1 and Hatf 2 was published in Jane’s Strategic Weapons System – Issue 03 March 1990.
2 For details of French sounding rockets see David Baker “The Rocket – The history of the development of the rocket and Missile
Technology”, New Cavendish Books, London 1978.
3 See S.Chandrashekar “An Assessment of Pakistan’s missile capability”, Missile Monitor, Number 3, 1993.
4 The Hatf 1 and Hatf 2 images are available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/missile/hatf-1.htm and http://
www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/missile/hatf-2.htm respectively.
5 Details of French sounding rockets and developments related to missiles including transfer to India and Pakistan are available
at http://www.univ-perp.fr/fuseurop/sudav_e.htm
A Brief History of the Pakistan Missile Programme
In the early 1990s available evidence indicated that Pakistan had 3 missiles under development.
These were the Hatf 1, the Hatf 2 and the Hatf 3 missiles.1 There was also substantive evidence
based on a number of images available in the public domain that these missiles were derived from
and based on sounding rocket technology transferred by France.2 The Dragon / Dauphin single
stage 560 mm diameter sounding rocket was identified as the source of technology for the Hatf 1
missile and the two stage Eridan 560 mm diameter sounding rocket as the source for the Hatf 2
missile. The Hatf 3 was supposedly based on a larger 820 mm diameter rocket.3 There is also a
record of sounding rocket production technology being transferred by the French company Sud
Aviation to SUPARCO the Pakistan organization that deals with Space and Upper Atmospheric
Research. Images of the Hatf 1 and the Hatf 2 are available in the public domain.4 The evidence
confirms the French Connection.5
Though there was a lot of speculation about Pakistan’s missile and space activities after these
disclosures, there was little tangible evidence of missile launches or major programmes of flight
testing. It was only after the launch of the Ghauri missile in April 1998 that the pace of missile
launches has picked up. From April 1998 till December 2006 Pakistan has launched a total of 26
missiles. Table 1 provides details of these launches. 7 Ghauri missiles, 7 Shaheen 1 missiles, 3
Shaheen 2 two-stage missiles, 4 Ghaznavi and 5 Abdali missiles have been launched by Pakistan.
Pakistan launched 5 missiles in 2002, 4 missiles in 2003, 6 missiles in 2004, 2 in 2005 and 5 in
2006. This change in the variety and tempo of launches seems to suggest that Pakistan wants to
have in place a credible missile-based deterrence as soon as possible.
Table 1: Chronology of Pakistan Missile Launches
Date Missile type Fuel
April 6, 1998 Ghauri Liquid
April 14, 1999 Ghauri Liquid
April 15, 1999 Shaheen 1 Solid
February 7, 2000 Hatf 1 Solid
May 25, 2002 Ghauri Liquid
May 26, 2002 Ghaznavi Solid
2
Figure 1 below provides details of the year-wise launches of the Pakistani missiles. Figure 2 provides
details of the different kind of missiles launched by Pakistan in the period 1998-2006.6
Figure 1
Pakistan Missile Launches- 1998-2006
6 Pakistan launched its second Shaheen 2 missile on March 19th 2005. A Babur cruise missile was launched on August 11th 2005.
Another Abdali launch took place on 19th February 2006. A 3rd Shaheen 2 launch took place on April 29th 2006. This was followed

















1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Date Missile type Fuel
May 28, 2002 Abdali Solid
October 4, 2002 Shaheen 1 Solid
October 8, 2002 Shaheen 1 Solid
March 26, 2003 Abdali Solid
October 3, 2003 Ghaznavi Solid
October 8, 2003 Shaheen 1 Solid
October 14, 2003 Shaheen 1 Solid
March 9, 2004 Shaheen 2 Solid
May 29, 2004 Ghauri Liquid
June 4, 2004 Ghauri Liquid
October 12, 2004 Ghauri Liquid
November 29, 2004 Ghaznavi Solid
December 8, 2004 Shaheen 1 Solid
March 19, 2005 Shaheen 2 Solid
March 31, 2005 Abdali Solid
February 19, 2006 Abdali Solid
April 29, 2006 Shaheen 2 Solid
November 16, 2006 Ghauri liquid
November 29, 2006 Shaheen 1 Solid
December 9, 2006 Ghaznavi Solid
3
Figure 2

















Ghauri Shaheen 1 Ghaznavi Abdali Shaheen 2
Type of Missile
Objectives of the Study
Though there is some material on the Pakistan missile programme in the public domain, it is still
a very difficult task to separate out the wheat from the chaff and make a realistic assessment of
the programme’s true capabilities. Information in the public domain is often noisy, garbled and
distorted. There are also vested interests and leaks that further muddy already muddy waters.
This study on the Pakistan missile programme attempts to provide an independent assessment of
Pakistani missile capabilities through a careful scrutiny and analysis of publicly available data.
We believe that such an independent assessment will contribute towards a better understanding
of the capabilities of one of India’s most important neighbours.
Approach and Methodology
❏ Look at all the literature and published material on Pakistan’s missiles.
❏ Specially look at images that are published or available on the Internet.
❏ In view of the reported connections between the Pakistan missile programme and Chinese
and North Korean missiles, also look at images and information on Chinese and North Korean
missiles.
❏ Use special image processing software to make measurements on the images.
❏ Interpret and use these measurements through an understanding of the basic characteristics
of missiles, their underlying technologies and the demands of operational testing. Look at
4
connections between countries in terms of observed relationships in missile characteristics.
Link these to published knowledge on technology transfer and exchanges.
❏ Use the measurements to estimate major missile parameters like quantities of propellant, lift
off mass. Use these measurements along with software for estimating the range, altitude,
time-of-flight of the missiles.
❏ Put all of this together to get an integrated picture of the technological capability.
❏ Complement the technology part with an assessment of the organisation of the missile
programme and its link with the other parts of the Pakistan security system.
❏ Link these findings to the national security strategy of Pakistan.
❏ Critically evaluate alternative conflict scenarios between India and Pakistan.
❏ Draw some policy prescriptions.
In our study we refer to images of every missile type through numbers. These are based upon a
library of images that we have created for each missile type.
Models for range estimations
Long range missiles lift off vertically. They then fly a trajectory during the powered phase that
enables them to reach a certain cut off velocity at a certain altitude. For maximum range there is
a certain optimum angle of injection.
During the powered phase atmospheric drag as well as gravity induced losses reduce the theoretical
velocity that a missile can achieve. While there are approximate estimates for these losses and we
could have used them we have chosen to build an Excel spread sheet model that quantifies drag
and gravity effects. Since the equations of motion of a powered rocket flight do not have explicit
closed form solutions we have adopted a numerical approach where accelerations, velocities and
distances are calculated at discrete time intervals along the trajectory.7 In this study we have
chosen a 1 second interval for these calculations.
Since most of the missiles analysed here are relatively short range missiles optimum angles of
injection are close to 45 degrees. The simulated trajectories for the lift off portion of the trajectory
can be modeled in such a way that injection values are close to this value of 45 degrees. Through
7 Apart from a ballistic missile primer available on the net (the author prefers not to be quoted) we have also validated these
from looking at the basic equations of motion for a thrusting rocket that includes atmospheric drag and gravity effects.
See George P Sutton "Rocket Propulsion Elements - an Introduction to the Engineering of Rockets", sixth edition  John Wiley &
Sons Inc, 1992.
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such a procedure we can get estimates of the drag and gravity losses. We can also get an estimate
of the altitude of injection and a measure of the range covered during the liftoff and re-entry
parts of the trajectory.
To get initial estimates of the thrust, if this information is not readily available, we use typical
estimates of thrust to weight ratios available in the literature on rocket propulsion. Specific impulse8
values are also taken from the literature if they are not explicitly stated.
Once the powered phase is over and the missile is injected, it follows a ballistic trajectory that has
a closed form solution for the purposes of our study.9 This part is once again modeled in an Excel
spreadsheet.
Since the re-entry part of the trajectory closely replicates the lift off part in terms of range we
can include the relevant results from the simulation of the liftoff into the range model to get
estimates of the range. Other flight parameters like time-of-flight, altitude reached can also be
estimated. Figure 3 depicts a typical trajectory for a ballistic missile.
Figure 3











8 Specific impulse can be defined simply as the thrust per unit weight flow rate of the propellant. Its normal unit of measurement
is seconds.
9 See J.W Cornelisse, H.F.R. Schoyer, K.F.Wakker "Rocket Propulsion and Spaceflight Dynamics" Pitman Publishing Limited,
London 1979. Chapter 13 specifically addresses ballistic trajectories.
For each of the Pakistani missiles we have both a liftoff as well as a range model. In view of the
fact that the origins of some of Pakistan’s missiles are linked to technology transfer from China,
we have also made such computations for some of the Chinese missiles for which images are
available. These technical calculations along with measurements on the images of the missiles
form the basis for much of our analysis.
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Problems of Interpretation of Image Analysis Data
How can we reconcile all the variations that we see in the image data? It is possible that images
especially digital ones undergo distortion of various kinds when they are transferred from one
location to another. A plethora of formats and zooming and editing options available in the PC
makes it difficult to separate out original images from various digital avatars. There are several
obviously distorted images available on the Net. Images taken from TV origins are also likely to
face some distortion. This is one kind of problem.
The second reason for the variation is that because of the surfeit of images, the image of one
launch is used along with a story of a second launch. This could be because the image of the most
recent launch is not readily available. This problem may surface if newspapers or news channels
are sources. Agencies such as think tanks may also mistakenly put images into the wrong category
simply because of the very large number of images that they may have to deal with.
Some variations we see may arise from doctoring. In the Ghauri set of images, image 6 seems to
be one such image.
Some engineering logic may help reconcile some of the variations. It is likely that the first launch
of any missile will only carry a dummy warhead.10 This will mean a reduced overall length of the
missile. In later flights the dummy warhead is replaced with a warhead that closely matches the
real warhead to be used. This means that early flights may have a smaller warhead (a lower
Length to Diameter ratio) and later flights a longer warhead (a higher Length to Diameter ratio).
It is quite likely that as a minimum all Pakistani missiles will carry 2 kinds of warheads – a
conventional warhead and a longer nuclear warhead. This means that the Length to Diameter
ratio (L/D) will vary over a certain range. In principle it is also possible that the missiles can also
carry several different kinds of nuclear warheads.11 One would therefore legitimately expect to
see some variations in live tests of missiles over a period of time as a particular missile programme
matures.
10 In development flights of launchers the first flight and maybe even later development flights may not carry a operational
payload. They normally will carry extra instrumentation to monitor and measure performance both during liftoff and reentry.
Such practices would be applicable to missiles also. The payload configuration and length may therefore be different and usually
smaller.
11 One would expect this to happen as warhead developments especially in miniaturization and explosive power are progressively
developed. Given the current status of the maturity of the warhead development in Pakistan one would not expect to see too




There is a lot of material and several pictures available of the Abdali missile. One of the publicly
available sites also provides a live video recording of its launch and flight.12 We picked a few of the
available pictures for a more detailed analysis.
We know from earlier work that the Pakistan missiles known as the Hatf 1, Hatf 2 and the Hatf 3
were derived in large part from French sounding rocket technology.13 The French company SUD
Aviation transferred sounding rocket production know-how to SUPARCO. A rocket propellant
and motor production plant was also set up.14 The evidence seemed to indicate that the Hatf 1
missile was largely derived from the French Dauphin rocket with some stretching of the rocket
motor to improve range and performance. These early assessments also seemed to suggest that
Pakistan with some effort could produce Hatf 1 in reasonable numbers fairly quickly.
Even though these assessments were carried out in the early 1990s Pakistan did not appear to be
having a major missile development programme that involved flight testing.15 It has been only
after the launch of Pakistan’s Ghauri missile in April 1998 that evidence of Pakistan’s growing
mastery over solid propulsion technologies has emerged.
Abdali launches
There have been 5 reported launchings of the Hatf 1/Abdali missiles in the post Ghauri period.
The first launching of what was reported as the Hatf 1A took place on February 7th 2000.
Subsequent launchings of the Abdali missile are reported to have taken place on 28th May 2002,
March 26th 2003, 31st March 2005 and 19th February 2006.16
Analysis of images
Details of an image by image analysis of the various Abdali Missiles are provided in the Appendix
12 Video recordings of different Pakistan missiles are available at http://www.pakistanidefence.com
13 S.Chandrashekar, "An Assessment of Pakistan's Missile Capability", Missile Monitor, Number 3, 1993.
14 Several sources talk about this. For a formal statement indicating transfer of technology and production know-how to SUPARCO
please see the report on SUD Aviation Sounding Rockets "From Belier to Eridan" at http://www.univ-perp.fr/fuseurop/sudav_e.htm.
The history of rocketry including the link between the civilian and military part of the French programme is well covered in the
documents available in this site.
15 There were reports of flight tests conducted in 1989 and about a possible space launch. These are speculative and not substantiated
by any hard publicly available evidence.
16 The sites of the images are in Appendix1. For details of the  19th February 2006 launch  please see http://www.spacewar.com/
news/missiles-05u.html and, http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.php?id=134741.
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An analysis of the various pictures clearly indicates a trend of improving performance and
capabilities. A comparison of the evolution of the Abdali warheads with the Chinese M11 warhead
reveals many common features.
The more recent images show some stretching of the length of the missile. Both the rocket motor
and the warhead seem to have been stretched. This would point to a gradual improvement in
terms of capability. Measurements of the missile dimensions (based on a missile diameter of 0.56
m) carried out on these images are provided in the Table 2 below.
Table 2: Summary of Measurements on the Abdali Missile
17 There could be some errors in measurement of the warhead, rocket motor and nozzle lengths.
18 See "Early ONERA rockets" and "The Precious Stones" at http://www.univ-erp.fr/fuseurop/sudav_e.htm Details of various
rocket motors are provided here that enables propellant mass stage mass and lengths to be related. Of course better propellants
with better characteristics would have been used in the missile derivatives of the French sounding rockets. However, these would
not alter the quantities of propellant and the stage masses of the missiles derived from them.
19 The estimated propellant loading for the 2 longer versions of the Abdali are 863 kg and 1028 kg respectively. This translates into
a booster weight of 1256 kg and 1530 kg. With a 500 kg payload this would mean a liftoff weight of 1756 and 2030 kg for these
2 versions of the Abdali.
Image Length (m) Warhead + Rocket motor +
interface (m)  nozzle (m)
Image 1 17 Hatf 1 /1A 4.39 m Not reliable Not reliable
Image 2 Abdali 4.37 m 1.72 m 2.65 m
Image 3 Abdali 4.90 m 2.02 m 2.89 m
Image 4 Abdali 5.38 m 2.24 m 3.14 m
Image 5 Abdali 6.57 m 2.83 m 3.73 m
Image 6 Abdali 6.44 m 2.68 m 3.76 m
From Table 2 the two longer versions of the Abdali appear to have lengths of approximately 5.38
and approximately 6.50 metres. The rocket motors show an increase in length from 2.65 metres
to approximately 3 m and then to approximately 3.75 metres. The warhead portions of the two
longer missile configurations have lengths of 2.24 and 2.83 metres respectively. The rocket motor
+ nozzle part have lengths of 3.14 and 3.73 m. Taken together, they represent significant
improvements over the original capability acquired from France through technology transfer.
Range and other parameters of the Abdali Missile
Data on various 560 millimetre diameter rocket motors are available in the public domain. Known
lengths of these motors can be related to propellant loadings and stage masses.18 Using this
knowledge we can convert our measurements of rocket motor lengths into propellant and stage
masses. Once stage masses and propellant weights19 are known we can calculate ranges as well
as other related parameters like time of flight, apogee height etc. for any payload.
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The ranges estimated for the two versions of the Abdali missile with a 500 kg
payload are 85 km and 95 km respectively. The time-of-flight and the apogee heights for
the missiles are 163 seconds, 176 seconds, 28 km and 31 km respectively.  
 
Assessment
Due to their limited range it is unlikely that the Abdali missiles carry nuclear warheads. Though
these Abdali missiles do not pose a strategic threat because of their range limitations a study of
their evolution over time provides us some insights into Pakistan’s technological and organizational
capabilities. We can see a progressive improvement that has built upon the original French sounding
rocket technology, internalised it and is now able to substantially improve upon it. From the
original Hatf 1 to the improved Abdali longer variants, Pakistan has demonstrated significant
progress.
The refinements are seen in the stretching of the rocket motors, a reduction in the length of the
nozzles, the improvements in the warhead section, and a possible ability to separate the warhead
section and spin it up. The warheads also share some common features with Chinese M11
warheads. That this M11 knowledge has been transferred to the relatively indigenous Abdali
programme provides additional evidence of Pakistan’s improved understanding of solid propulsion
technology. Production of these missiles in reasonable numbers should be expected.
The Transportable Erector Launcher (TEL) for the Abdali is based on the Russian / Chinese MAZ
543. The tyre diameter is however only 1.3 m, lower than the diameter of the tyres used for the




Four flights of the Ghaznavi missile have taken place. The first of them took place on 26th May
2002, the second on October 3rd, the third on November 29th 200420 and the most recent of them
on December 9th 2006.21 There are also reports that the missiles have been declared operational.22
There has been much speculation about the origins of the Ghaznavi missiles. They have been
linked to the Chinese M11 missiles as well as the Chinese M9 missiles. There are also lots of
variations reported on its parameters - length, diameter, range, payload etc. in the published
literature.23 A Pakistani website carries a video clipping of the launch of the Ghaznavi missile.24
There were reports in the early 1990s that the Chinese were exporting M11 missiles and technology
to Pakistan. The US government imposed sanctions on some Pakistani and Chinese entities in
1993-94 lending some credence to the claim of export of missiles and technology. According to
various sources about 34 M11 missiles were supplied and Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs)
for moving and launching the missiles were also a part of the deal.25  Other reports suggest that
Pakistan has in operation a facility for the production of M11 missiles26.
It is only after the launch of the Ghauri missile in 1998 that Pakistan has launched a number of
missiles including the Ghaznavi missile.
In our pursuit of the origins and current status of the Ghaznavi missile we have looked at available
data and information on the Ghaznavi. In view of its possible Chinese origin we have also looked
at data on the Chinese M11 missile. We have used available images to study these possible links in
detail. We have also tried to estimate the range of the Ghaznavi using all this data and information.
20   The dates and the launchings have been compiled from various newspaper reports. Source details are available in the Appendix.
21 See http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2006-12/09/content_754829.htm and at http://mdn.mainichi-msn.co.jp/
international/news/20061209p2g00m0in012000c.html for images of the December 9th 2006 launch.
22 These handing over reports were widely reported in various Pakistan papers. See "Army gets Ghaznavi missile", Daily Times,
February 22nd 2002, Online edition.
23 There seems to be confusion both in terms of diameter as well as length. Diameter estimates vary from about 0.8 metres to about
1 metre. Length estimates vary from about 7.5 metres to 11.25 metres. Once a report based on some technical assessment even
if it is wrong is put out it seems to have a life of its own even if it is corrected later.
24 http://www.pakistanidefence.com
25 Many sources talk of this. For one version of this see http://www.fas.org./nuke/guide/china/theater/df-11.html. Another source
talks of the export. See http://www..aeronautics.ru/archive/wmd/ballistic/ballistic/css77-01.html It however confuses the
Ghaznavi which is derived from the Chinese M11 and the Shaheen which is derived from the Chinese M9.
26 Charles  Smith "China's nuke missile plant in Pakistan - India developing land - based. Aerial, sub-launched nuclear capability"
at http://www.worldnetdaily.com/new/printer-friendly.asp?ARTICLE, WorldNet Daily, Friday June 30, 2000.
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According to many reports the Chinese M11 was supposed to be a solid propellant replacement
for the liquid propelled SCUD B27 Russian (Soviet) missile. The missile was meant to cater to both
the domestic and export markets. Due to MTCR considerations, the Chinese were reported to
have reduced the length of the missile by about 2 metres to meet the 300 km 500 kg payload limit.
These reduced length M11 missiles were the ones exported to Pakistan and de facto became the
Ghaznavi missile.28
As mentioned earlier there are also reports that production facilities for the production of these
missiles have been set up with Chinese help. Pakistan has also had a long exposure to solid rocket
motor production and technology in view of the French transfer of sounding rocket technology.
Analysis of images
Details of the analysis of the various Ghaznavi missiles are provided in the Appendix. To explore
the China connection a bit further we also analysed 4 images of the M11 available in a semi-
official  Chinese website.29 One of the pictures of the Ghaznavi available in a (official) Pakistani
website shows the missile being erected from its TEL.30 If the Ghaznavi is really an M11 variant,
the TEL which is used to carry and erect the missile must be a Chinese copy of the Russian MAZ
543 TEL whose dimensions are well known.31 Using this as a benchmark, the estimated diameter
of the Ghaznavi is very close to the 0.88 metre diameter of the M11. This would tend to substantiate
the Chinese origin for the Ghaznavi. The measurements for the Ghaznavi and the M11 from the
images are summarized in Table 3.
27 For data on the SCUD see "R-17 rocket tech dossier" at http://www.russianspaceweb.com/r17.html. There is also information
from French sites.
28 There are several sources that talk of the connections. The M11 Chinese missile is supposed to be a solid version of the Soviet /
Russian SCUD B missile. See http://www.fas.org./nuke/guide/china/theater/df-11.html and http://www..aeronautics.ru/archive/
wmd/ballistic/ballistic/css77-01.html. Most of the information  may be sourced  in part from Janes Strategic Weapon Systems.
A more elaborate presentation of the origins and exports is available at http://www.sinodefence.com/nuclear/df11.asp. Another
site that provides similar information on origins and exports is http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd
29 A number of images and briefs on various facets of the Chinese military and defence programmes are available on the net. The
images used are available at http://www.sinodefence.com/nuclear/df11.asp
30 See  http://www.pakistanidefence.com
31 Reports on the dimensions of the TEL for the SCUD series of missiles including the Scud B are widely available. Our analysis uses
this as a basis for many of the measurements made on the images. A Russian version of the MAZ 543 data is available http://
legion.wplus.net/guide/army/tr/maz543.shtml#R0. Another version (German) can be found in http://www.reserve-info.de/
aridat/scud.htm. Data can also be obtained from the Trembikta website in the Ukraine at http://www.trembikta.com.ua/eng/
auto/maz-53.html. There is also information available on Iraq's version of the TEL.
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Table 3: Measurement Summary Ghaznavi & M11 Missiles
32 The image is such that the overall length measurement may be a little inaccurate.
33 We can surmise alternatively that what we are seeing is the same warhead for the Ghaznavi and that the differences are due to
measurement errors. We can also surmise that we are only seeing 2 warheads for the M11 and not 3. This argument is also
consistent with our measurements.
34 The 4th measurement may have some inaccuracies in length because of the nature of the image. This may also mean that the
Ghaznavi does not have different rocket motors but only one rocket motor that is approximately 5 to 5.1 m long. This is about
0.7 to 1.5 m shorter than the M11 rocket motors we are seeing in our sample of M11 images.
Image Warhead length Rocket motor length Total length
Image 1 3.76 m 5.05 m 8.81 m
Image 2 4.01 m 4.90 m 8.91 m
3rd launch (average) 4.31 m 5.17 m 9.48 m
4th launch32 4.11 m 4.80 m 8.90 m
M11 image 1 N.A N.A 11.34
M11 image 2 3.81 m 5.76 m 9.57 m
M 11 image 3 4.09 m 6.54 m 10.65 m
M 11 image 4 4.80 m 6.17 m 10.97 m
The measurements on the Ghaznavi missiles indicate warhead lengths of 3.80 m., 4.14, 4.31 and
4.2m. The available evidence from the images of the M11 seems to indicate that there are
3 warheads – 3.81 m, 4.09m and 4.80m. The shorter Chinese warheads closely match
the warhead dimensions of the Ghaznavi missile.33
There are also 3 incremental versions of the Chinese M11 rocket motor with lengths of 5.76m,
6.17m and 6.54 m. The most reliable rocket motor lengths of the Ghaznavi missile as measured
from the image set are 5.21 m, 4.91 m and 5.17 m.34. Assuming an average rocket motor length
of approximately 5 to 5.1 metres, it is evident that the Ghaznavi rocket motor is shorter than the
M11 rocket motor. The average length of the Ghaznavi missile we are seeing is
9.1 m which is also substantially shorter than the shortest M11.
There are 2 (maybe 3) warheads and 3 rocket motor lengths that seem to be part of the Chinese
M11 arsenal. In principle that would give rise to about 2x3 = 6 or 3x3 = 9 possible configurations
of warheads and rocket motors each of which would have a different total length. Of course even
though these combinations may be possible some of them may not be feasible because of some
technical problems like stability or because the particular combination of warhead and rocket
motor gives no specific practical advantage in terms of range or payload over other combinations
that have already been proven.
If we look at the shape and pattern of the Ghaznavi especially the warhead sections and the
various dimensions there is evidence to indicate that the Chinese have indeed supplied Pakistan
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with a shortened version of the shorter M11 variant. The warhead lengths of the Ghaznavi also
closely match the length of the Chinese warheads.
We can conclude – the Ghaznavi is a shortened version of the shorter variant of the Chinese M11
missile. The Ghaznavi may carry two kinds of warheads - a longer nuclear warhead and a shorter
conventional warhead. The warhead dimensions closely match warheads of the Chinese M11
missiles. The Chinese have however not transferred the longer version of their M11 missile nor the
later more advanced longer (4.80 m) version of their warhead.35
The public evidence is consistent with the logic that the Chinese have transferred
a shortened version of the shorter variant of the M 11 missile to Pakistan. This
version, which the Pakistanis call as the Ghaznavi, has a length of about 9.1
metres (between 8.9 and about 9.5 metres depending on the warhead) and a
diameter of 0.88 m. The Ghaznavi can carry two warheads - a warhead about
3.76 to 4 metres long or a longer warhead with a length of 4.31 metres. The
warhead dimensions as well as the general shape of the warheads closely match
the warheads of the M11. The observed evidence is consistent with the Chinese
origins of the Ghaznavi missile.
Performance of the Ghaznavi
The M11 is supposed to be a substitute for the SCUD and is compatible with the Russian MAZ 543
TEL mobile launcher. Since there is a lot of information available on the SCUD36 we can make
some reasonable assessments of the lift off weights and propellant weights of a SCUD compatible
solid propellant substitute missile.37 Making such a calculation we estimate the stage mass of the
Ghaznavi to be about 4903 kilograms and the propellant mass to be 3775 kilograms. With a
payload of 1000 kilograms this gives a Lift off Weight (LOW) of 5903 kilograms.38 The range of
the Ghaznavi with a 1000 kg nuclear warhead works out to be 269 kms. The time of flight works
35 Public accounts of the M11 talk of a conventional warhead, a nuclear warhead and an improved warhead with nozzle
control. See http://www.fas.org./nuke/guide/china/theater/df-11.html. For another source with a similar view see
http://www.sinodefence.com/nuclear/df11.asp
36 A lot of information from various sources are available. See the R17 Rocket dossier at http://www.russianspaceweb.com/
r17.html. Also see "DOD: Information Paper - Iraq's Scud Ballistic Missiles" http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/Pentagon/
dodscud.htm
37 There are many estimates of the propellant and stage masses of the SCUD B missiles. Most of them are reasonably close to each
other. We take a value of 3700 kg for the propellant carried by the SCUD B as the basis. Since the SCUD B was designed for a
propellant oxidizer combination of UDMH and IRFNA whose average density we know to be 1220 kg per cubic metre we can
estimate a volume for the liquid propellants. If instead of liquids we use a solid propellant whose density is about 1700 kg per
cubic metre we get a solid propellant mass (3775 kg in our case) that can be carried in the same volume as the SCUD B liquid
fuel. Using this value and typical mass fractions for solid rocket stages we get a stage mass for the Ghaznavi as 4903 kilograms.
If we assume a payload mass of 1 tonne for a typical  nuclear payload we can compute the range and other flight parameters of
the Ghaznavi missile.
38 This is an estimate for the typical nuclear warhead to be carried by a longer range missile.
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out to be 267 seconds and the altitude of the missile works out to be 75 kms. The range with a 700
kg payload is 347 km with a time of flight of 301 seconds and a maximum altitude of 94 kms.
(See Figure 4).
For comparison the range of the M11 with a 1000 kilogram payload is approximately 384 kilometres
with a time of flight of 332 seconds and an altitude of 109 km.
Assessment
There is little doubt that the Ghaznavi is a shortened version of the Chinese M11
































































700 kg payload). 4 launches of this missile have taken place as compared to
7 launches of the Ghauri or the Shaheen 1 missile. This may be because these
are well-tested operational missiles and therefore Pakistan does not need to test
them. The more recent tests may also be to tell India that they have the missiles
that can deliver required payloads.
The Ghaznavi Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) is also a copy of the Russian





Immediately after the first launch of the Ghauri missile they were a number of articles on its
origins and capabilities.39 Since the first launch on April 6th 1998 there have been 6 additional
launches of the missile - April 14th 1999, May 25th 2002, May 29th 2004, June 4th 2004,  October
12th 2004 40 and 16th November 2006. 2004 saw 3 launches. The peak of 3 launches in 2004 would
seem to indicate that the missile is operational.
We have studied some of the images that have been put out by Pakistan as well as other images
that are available in the public domain.41
Analysis of Ghauri images
The Appendix provides details of the analysis on various Ghauri images in the public domain.
Since the warhead was difficult to separate from the other elements of the missile we used the red
band 42 around the nosecone (found on all images of the Ghauri) as an identifying mark to
separate out potential variants of the missile.43
Table 4 summarises the measurements we have made on the various Ghauri images.
Table 4: Summary measurements on Ghauri Images
39 See David C. Wright "An Analysis of the Pakistani Ghauri Missile Test of April 6, 1998", Science and Global Security 1998, Volume
7, pp 227-236. Also see S.Chandrashekar "The Origins and antecedents of the Ghauri missile - An assessment", Current Science
Vol.76 no.3 10th February 1999, pp 280-285.
40 Compiled from published information and Press reports.
41 The sources for the images are http://www.pakistanidefence.com, images available from newspaper and news agency sources
such as the Tribune, Dawn, Al Jazeera. We have also used a couple of images taken from the FAS website which are in turn taken
from official Pakistani government / semi government sources. We have tried to relate the images to the sources and specific
dates of launching. Consistency checks between what we see in the image what we infer from published information and our own
assessment is therefore crucial. All sources are referred to in the Appendix.
42 The warhead would be longer than the red band length and should include an interface with the booster stage.
43 The total length of the missile less the nosecone should approximately be equal to the stage length. This assumes that there is no
interface between the nosecone and the stage. Obviously this is not correct. However since we are only trying to find out whether
there has been a change in the stage length this may be a valid approach to follow.
Image Date L/D ratio Length (m) Red band Length less Comments
(m) red band
Image 1 April 1998 11.29 14.68 m 2.75 m 11.93 m Same as Images 6, 7.
Image 2 April 1998 11.11 14.44 m 2.85 m 11.56 m Similar to Image 1
Image 3 April 1999 11.23 14.59 m 2.35 m 12.24 m Not image 1
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Image Date L/D ratio Length (m) Red band Length less Comments
(m) red band
Image 4 April 1999 12.48 16.22 m 2.99 m 13.23 m Same as Image 5
Image 5 May 2002 12.48 16.23 m 2.94 m 13.29 m Same as Image 4
Image 6 May 2004 11.26 14.65 m 2.68 m 11.97 m Same as Image 1
Image 7 Oct. 2004 11.31 14.70 m 2.84 m 11.86 m Same as Image 1
Image 8 Oct. 2004 12.64 16.44 m 3.06 m 13.38 m Same as Image 9
Image 9 Oct. 2004 12.51 16.27 m 2.90 m 13.37 m Same as Image 8
Image 10 Post 1st launch 10.83 14.08 m 2.10 m 11.98 m Training missiles?
Image 11 Post 1st launch 10.89 14.16 m 2.38 m 11.78 m Training Missiles?
Image 16 Nov. 2006 12.33 16.03 m 2.74 m 13.29 m Different missile
We can infer from the analysis that Images 1, 6 and 7 though shown as images of different
launches are possibly pictures of the same missile. In the same way Images 4 and 5 though shown
to be different launches may also be the same missile. Image 6 appears to be a doctored image.
A white strip across the diameter seems to have been pasted on to image 1 to get image 6. A close
scrutiny of the images that are supposedly images of different launches taking place on different
dates show that there are only 4 (maybe 5) distinct images. Many of the images we see are
possibly the same missile.44 The details of the logic that seems to suggest this are in the Appendix.
From Table 4 there seem to be 3 groupings – one group with a Length to Diameter ratio (L/D) of
approximately 10.9, another with an L/D value of 11.10 to 11.3 and a 3rd with an L/D value of
12.3 to 12.6.
Image 10 and Image 11 have L/D ratios of 10.83 to 10.89 with corresponding length of 14.08 and
14.16 metres. They could be dummy missiles used to train the launch crews. It is quite possible
from the measurements that the two images we see are pictures of the same dummy missile used
for training.
From Table 4 a second Ghauri missile configuration has an L/D Ratio of 11.1 to 11.3 with
corresponding lengths of 14.4 to 14.7 metres. A third configuration has an L/D ratio of 12.3 to
12.7 with corresponding lengths of 16 to 16.4 metres. This 3rd configuration length is close to the
lengths of the Ghauri missile put out in the published literature.
 In the absence of independent verification of the missile diameter we believe that the best estimate
of the diameter is what is reported in the literature – between 1.3 and 1.33 metres. We will use a
diameter of 1.3 metres in our analysis. Table 4 is based on a missile diameter of 1.3 metres.45
44 Since there have been 7 launches of the Ghauri we should expect to see at least 7 different images. The evidence that we see in
the images of doctoring would seem to indicate that there may have been 2 or 3 failures.
45 If 4 Scud engines each with a diameter of about 0.4 metres are clustered with some minimum separation they would fit into a
circle with a diameter of between 1.2 and 1.3 metres.
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Publicly available data for the tests of May 2004 and June 2004 are sparse. The image purported
to be that of the May 2004 launch (Image 6) appears to be doctored and not consistent
with a successful launch. By contrast the evidence for the October 2004 launch is fairly
convincing.
Based on Table 4 we can conclude that there are 3 configurations of the Ghauri missile. One
configuration could be a configuration with a dummy warhead for training purposes. A second
configuration which has a length of 14.6 to 14.7 metres may carry a conventional payload. The
3rd configuration which has a length of 16 to 16.4 metres may carry the nuclear payload.46 All the
configurations may use the same booster stage. The different lengths that we see are because of
the differing lengths of the warheads. The basic booster stage for all the configurations would be
the same. The analysis points to the Ghauri carrying at least 2 warheads with one warhead being
about 1.3 metres longer than the other. The longer warhead may be the nuclear warhead and the
shorter warhead could be the conventional warhead.47
Though Images 10 and 11 show the TEL, the dimensions of this TEL are not easily measured.
Performance of the Ghauri
Since it is difficult to accurately estimate the lengths of the propellant fuel tanks
from the various images, we have used estimates of propellant mass, stage mass
and lift off weight available in the published literature.48
There have also been some public statements from Pakistan sources that may help get a better fix
on the capabilities of the Ghauri. Specifically in a public statement the head of Pakistan’s solid
propulsion missile programme Dr. Samar Mubarik Mand49 has indicated that solid fuel based
missiles are inherently superior to liquid rockets using kerosene and nitric acid. In view of the
rivalry between the A.Q.Khan group (Khan Research Laboratories) responsible for liquid fuel
based missiles and the solid fuel based missile programme under the Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission there is good reason to believe Dr. Samar Mubarik Mand’s statement. If this were
true one would expect that the fuel used by the Ghauri is RP 1 (kerosene) and Red Fuming Nitric
46 This assumes that as of now Pakistan has only one kind of nuclear warhead. As development proceeds one would expect to see
other types of warheads.
47 We have also tried to measure the warhead lengths separately to establish that the rocket stage used is the same for all launches.
Because of the nature of the images and their quality these measurements are not very accurate. Details are in the Appendix.
48 S.Chandrashekar "The Origins and antecedents of the Ghauri missile - An assessment", Current Science, Vol.76, no.3 10 February
1999, pp 280-285.
49 Dr. Samar Mubarik Mand is the head of a new organization called the National Engineering & Scientific Commission that deals
exclusively with missiles.
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Acid (RFNA) and not UDMH50 and RFNA. This would in turn imply that the specific impulse51 of
the Ghauri would be lower than previous estimates.52
Based on the published data53 on the propellant loading, stage mass and lift off weight, we also
carried out a detailed assessment of the performance of the missile. We tried to reconcile the
published data on flight time, altitude and approximate range with the results we get from our
trajectory and range models. Fin area measurements from the first flight of the Ghauri were also
used to refine our estimates of the range and other flight parameters of the Ghauri. The ranges
and other flight parameters of the Ghauri with payload of 700 kg for specific impulses of 225, 230
and 235 seconds and for different injection angles were estimated.54 Based on the reported launch
and impact points we can estimate the range of the first launch to have been greater than 705 km
but possibly less than 800 km assuming some margins for range and safety. The published reports
also talks about a flight time of about 598 seconds and claims that the missile went up to height
of 350 kms.
An injection angle of 58 degrees (a lofted trajectory) and a specific impulse close to 235 seconds
gives a range of between 740 to 786 kms, a flight time of between 610 and 630 seconds and an
altitude of 334 to 353 kms. These values are reasonably close to the values reported after the first
launch. On this basis we would expect that the specific impulse of the Ghauri would be close to
235 seconds.
The range of the Ghauri with a 1000 kg and 700 kg payload is 818 km and 928 km respectively.
The flight times and altitudes for the 1000 kg and 700 kg payload cases are 497 seconds,
528 seconds, 221 km and 247 km respectively.
Figure 5 shows the range for a 1000 kg and 700 kg payload.
The range values are lower than the values reported earlier.55 We believe these values better reflect
the capabilities of the Ghauri based on the available evidence.
50 Unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine is a common liquid rocket fuel used widely.
51 Specific impulse can be defined as the thrust achieved for unit weight flow rate of the propellant. In layman's terms it is a
measure of the efficiency of the propulsion system.
52 See Hanif Khalid "How Shaheen Was Developed" Rawalpindi, Jang 19 April 1999 page 10 available at http://www.kokaniz.com/
shaheen.htm. In this article most probably based on an interview with Dr. Samar Mubarikmand the statement about nitric acid
and kerosene making holes in the tank is mentioned. This article also advocates why Shaheen solid fuel missiles are inherently
superior.
53 Lift off weight 16 tonnes, propellant mass 13 tonnes, payload 700 kg, place of launch near Malute, impact point near Quetta,
flight time 9 minutes 58 seconds, altitude 350 km. See S.Chandrashekar "The Origins and antecedents of the Ghauri missile - An
assessment", Current Science Vol.76 no.3 10th February 1999, pp 280-285.
54 An IRFNA and kerosene propellant combination would have an average specific impulse of around 235 seconds.
55 S.Chandrashekar, "The Origins and antecedents of the Ghauri missile - An assessment", Current Science Vol.76, no.3,


































































The Shaheen 1 Missile
Background and launches
There have been 7 launches of the Shaheen1 missile by Pakistan. These launches took place on
15th April 1999, October 4th 2002, October 8th 2002, October 8th 2003, October 14th 2003, December
8th 2004 and November 29th 2006. As in the case of the other Pakistan missiles there are a number
of images of these missiles in the public domain. Some of them are officially put out by entities
close to the government. There are also a number of reports and analyses on the Pakistan missile
programme that we have consulted. There is also a site that provides a video of the launch.56
Using the same methodology that we had adopted for the Ghaznavi and the Ghauri missiles we
have analysed the Shaheen 1 missiles.
Analysis of images
As was the case with the Ghaznavi missile there is a lot of material in the public domain on the
connections between the Shaheen missile and the Chinese M9 (DF 15) missile.57 We have analysed
a number of images of the Shaheen 1 and the M9 to critically examine this connection.58 Details
of the analysis of each image are in the Appendix.
The results of the analysis from the publicly available images of the Shaheen 1 missile along with
some images of the M9 Chinese missiles are reflected in Table 5 below.
Table 5: Summary of Measurements Made on Shaheen 1 & M9
56 A number of video recordings of different Pakistan missiles are available at http://www.pakistanidefence.com.
57 See for e.g. http://www.aeronautics .ru/archive/wmd/ballistic/ballistic/hatf4-01.htm There is a lot of confusion between the
Ghaznavi and the Shaheen since their diameters are fairly close and the lengths not too different.
58 These are from various sources on the net. A list of the sources is available in the Appendix.
Image L/D Warhead Motor incl Length (m) Comment
ratio + if (m) nozzle (m)
Image 1 9.62 N.A N.A 9.62 m Diameter of 1 m validated via TEL
Image 2 9.89 3.71 m 6.18 m 9.89 m Missile on launch pad
Image 3 9.92 3.56 m 6.36 m 9.92 m Same as image 2 – launch pad image
Image 4 9.69 3.28 m 6.40 m 9.69 m Launch image – resembles images 2 & 3. Tilt
makes measurement inaccurate. Dummy
payload?
Image 5 11.43 4.27 m 7.15 m 11.43 m Launch image. Different from Image 4.
Image 6 12.69 4.81 m 7.88 m 12.69 m Launch image – nuclear payload
Image 7 11.64 4.45 m 7.18 m 11.64 m Launch image – shorter warhead – similar to
Image 5.
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Image L/D Warhead Motor incl Length (m) Comment
ratio + if (m) nozzle (m)
Image 8 12.83 4.83 m 8 m 12.83 m Launch image – nuclear payload – similar to
image 6.
Image 23 12.20 4.75 7.45 m 12.20 m New rocket motor + earlier warhead?
Image 9 (M9) 8.86 4.41 m 4.45 m 8.86 m New TEL. Different from MAZ 543 TEL
Image 10  (M9) 8.89 4.08 m 4.81 m 8.89 m Diameter 1 m verified using MAZ 543 TEL
dimensions
Image 11 (M9) 9.70 5.08 m 4.62 m 9.70 m Longer warhead. New configuration
Image 12 (M9) 8.40 3.53 m 4.87 m 8.40 m Short warhead. Early configuration?
Image 13 (M9) 8.84 4.29 m 4.54 m 8.84 m Similar to image 9.
The diameter of the Shaheen 1 and the M9 can be independently verified to be 1 metre. This
common diameter validates Chinese help with the Shaheen 1 programme.
Images 1, 2 and 3 are images of the Shaheen 1 on its TEL or being readied for launch. Image 4 is
the launch of a missile which closely resembles Image 2 and Image 3.  From Table 5, Images 1, 2,
3 and maybe Image 4 are compatible with a approximately 9.9 metre long, 1 metre diameter
Shaheen missile. It is also compatible with the logic of a dummy warhead being tested on early
development flights of missiles. The rocket motor length for this early configuration is
approximately  6.4 metres and the warhead along with its interface has a length of approximately
3.6 metres.
Image 5 and Image 7 seem to be very similar. This configuration of the Shaheen 1 has a length
between 11.4 and 11.6 metres. It carries a shorter (approximately  4.35 m) warhead which may
be a conventional warhead. The rocket motor length for this configuration is approximately
7.15 metres.
Image 6 and 8 are also very similar. This configuration of this Shaheen 1 has an overall length of
12.7 to 12.8 metres. It carries a longer approximately 4.8 m (nuclear) payload. The rocket motor
length for this configuration is approximately 7.80 m.
From these images we can confirm that there have been at least 5 clear and separate launches of
the Shaheen 1. The visual evidence confirms these launchings. Three different rocket motors with
lengths of 6.4 m, 7.15 m and 7.8 m have been used in these launches.
Image 23 is a picture of the most recent Shaheen 1 launch of November 29th 2006. The warhead
length (4.75 m) for this launch is very close to the warhead lengths we see in images 6 and 8.
However its rocket motor length is 7.45 m which is somewhere between the 7.15 m and 7.8 m
rocket motor lengths seen in earlier launches.
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The sequence of rocket motor lengths approximately 6.4 m, 7.15 m, 7.45 m and
7.8 m, the sequence of warheads from dummy warheads via conventional
warheads to nuclear warheads (lengths of approximately 3.60 m, 4.35 m and
4.8 m) and the clear evidence of at least 6 different and distinct flights indicates
that Pakistan has a robust Shaheen 1 programme.
What is the contribution of China to the Shaheen 1 programme? Table 5 also provides data on
Chinese M9 missiles. We can see very clearly that all the Shaheen 1 missiles have lengths that are
much greater than the M9 missiles. This means that the Shaheen 1 is not a direct copy. Lengthening
the rocket motor also implies that other parameters of the missile have to be modified or changed
and should logically mean an increase in capability for system engineering and integration.
When we look at the warheads of the M9 and the Shaheen 1 there are a great many similarities.
There are also differences such as the absence of fins in the warhead for the M9.
The incremental changes that we see in the sequence of Shaheen 1 missile tests would seem to
suggest that though the Chinese have transferred the basic 1 metre diameter technology as well as
some warhead related know-how, Pakistan has internalised this knowledge and is now able to
build up on this and proceed independently on its own largely indigenous programme.
Performance of the Shaheen 1
The images, especially the ones of the Shaheen 1 in flight, also help us to get some idea of the sizes
of the warheads, the rocket motor and the nozzles. This in turn enables us to get an idea of the
amount of propellant that can be carried. We can use this information to estimate the mass of the
missile. We can then run a trajectory and estimate the range and other flight parameters.59 The
stage mass and propellant mass for the Shaheen 1 is 7916 and 6333 kg respectively.60 For the M9
the stage mass and the propellant mass work out to be 4426 and 3541 kg respectively. These
values are used along with our lift off and range models to estimate various missile parameters
like range, time of flight and altitude.
59 Image 10 an M9 image indicates a maximum length of the rocket motor and nozzle of 5.27 m. Using values of 0.5 metres for the
head end and tail end domes and a measured value of 1.15 metres for the visible nozzle part, the length of the propellant grain
works out to be 3.12 m. This translates into a volume of 2.45 cubic metres. With a volume fraction of propellant of 85% and a
mass ratio of 80% for the stage motor the propellant mass and the stage mass works out to be 3541 and 4426 kg respectively.
A similar approach is used on the largest Shaheen motor to estimate the propellant and stage masses. For the Shaheen 1 the
propellant mass and the stage mass are estimated as 6333 and 7916 kg respectively. These are the values used to estimate ranges
and other flight parameters.
60 One source reports the that the missile weighs 9 tons with a propellant weight of 7 tons, 1 ton motor and 1 ton warhead. The
lift off weight we have got is close to the value reported. The same article also talks of many Indian targets within a 300 km to
400 km range. See Hanif Khalid "How Shaheen Was Developed" Rawalpindi, Jang 19 April 1999 page 10 available at
http://www.kokaniz.com/shaheen.htm.
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The maximum range of the Shaheen 1 with payloads of 1000 kg and 700 kg is 410 km and
495 km respectively. The time of flight and the apogee height of the Shaheen 1 for these 2 cases are
343 seconds, 375 seconds, 116 km and 136 km respectively.
By contrast the maximum range of the M9 that we get is 219 km and 279 km for a 1000 kg and
700 kg payload respectively. The time of flight and the apogee height for these 2 cases are
241 seconds, 281 seconds, 63 km and 84 km respectively.
Figure 6 provides the details of the Shaheen 1 range for payloads of 1000 and 700 kg.
We can see that though the diameters of the M9 and the Shaheen 1 are the same, the performance
of the Shaheen 1 is much better with a range of 410 and 495 km with a 1000 kg and 700 kg
payload respectively. As we have stated earlier, a comparison of the warhead part between the
Shaheen 1 and the M9 reveal similarities that indicate a common origin. The range of the M9 as
estimated is lower than the range of the smaller diameter M11 missile. This lends credence to the
view that the publicly revealed capabilities of the M9 conceal much more than what they reveal.61
The real capabilities of the M9 are likely to be significantly more. The M9 as originally conceived
was supposedly a part of the 2-stage M18 missile.62 Since the Shaheen 1 missiles are longer than
the M9 missiles the argument that it is Chinese technology that is manifest in the Shaheen 1 does
have some logic.
On balance
❏ The warheads of the M9 and the Shaheen 1 are similar
❏ The original TEL carrying the Shaheen 1 on parade is similar to the MAZ 543 TEL. Images of
the M9 are also similar or are the same as the MAZ 543 TEL.
❏ Pakistan does not appear to possess the Chinese developed TEL. The TEL carrying the Shaheen
1 is very similar to the M11 Ghaznzvi MAZ 543 TEL.63 China has also used such a TEL for its
launches though later versions of the M9 are carried on the new Chinese developed TEL.
61 If they were developed as tactical missiles in the context of Taiwan and if the M11 and M9 were developed by separate groups
for carrying a much smaller tactical warhead the shorter lengths are understandable. M9s were tested  during the Taiwan Straits
crisis of 1995-96 as a show of Chinese strength and intentions to act if Taiwan moved towards declaring independence. Both the
M11 and the M9 may have been used to test an improved more accurate tactical nuclear warhead targeted at Taiwan.
62 See http://www.aeronautics.ru/archive/wmd/ballistic/ballistic/css6-01.htm which actually is sourced from Jane's Strategic
Weapons System. According to this the M18 is a larger 2-stage version of the M9. Another source http://www.globalsecurity.org/
wmd/world/china/df-11.htm claims that the M18 is a two stage version of the M11.
63 Some modifications to the TEL may be needed to carry the larger diameter (1 m) Shaheen 1.
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❏ The lengths of the Shaheen 1 missiles are longer. One early version of the Shaheen 1 has a
length close to one of the M9 configurations. Later versions of the Shaheen 1 are all longer.
❏ The flight testing sequence seems to follow a logical - dummy warhead test followed by a
conventional warhead test followed by a nuclear warhead test - sequence. Images we have
looked at are consistent with this approach.
❏ No M9 with the length of the Shaheen 1 is seen in the publicly available images though it is
possible that the Chinese have such stages.
❏ The different rocket motor lengths and different warheads that we see in the sequence of
Shaheen 1 launches indicates an increasingly sophisticated capability to customize missiles
for meeting different operational requirements.
The conclusion we can draw is that there is little doubt about Chinese transfer of technology for
the Shaheen 1 missile development by Pakistan. However, this does not necessarily translate into
an absence of technology, system design and integration capability in Pakistan. The evidence
would seem to suggest that though the Chinese have helped, Pakistan is now quite capable of
moving forward on is own.



































































The first launch of the two stage Shaheen missile took place on March 9th 2004. Subsequent
launches took place on March 19th 2005 and April 29th 2006.64
Table 6 below summarises the measurements made on some of the images of these launchings.
The details on each of the Images are available in the Appendix.
Table 6: Summary Measurements on Shaheen 2 Images
Image Launch Warhead 2nd stage 1st stage Length Comments
date length65 length 66 length67
Image 15 March 2004 3.18 m 3.53 m 5.19 m 11.88 m Image of 1st launch
Image 16 March 2005 3 m 3.72 m 5.45 m 12.18 m Measurements on images of the 2nd
launch match well. They are
reasonably close to the measurements
from the 1st launch
Image 17 March 2005 3.2 m 3.45 m 5.40 m 12.05 m
Image 18 March 2005 3.04 m 3.54 m 5.41 m 12 m
Image 20 April 2006 3.38 m 3.65 m 5.65 m 12.68 m Measurements of the 3rd launch match
well. Increase in length compared to
1st and 2nd launches
We can see clearly from Table 8 that the length of the first 2 launches are clustered around
approximately  12 m. Warhead lengths are  approximately 3.10 m. 2nd stage lengths are
approximately  3.56 m and 1st stage lengths are approximately 5.36 m.
The 3rd launch however seems to have an overall length of approximately 12.57 m which is higher
than the values for the first two launches. The 2nd stage of this launch is quite close to the length
of the 2nd stage of the other two launches. However, the warhead is longer and the 1st stage also
seems to be marginally longer. The 3rd Shaheen 2 launch seems to be a stretched version.
These trends that we see in the Shaheen 2 substantiate what we had observed in our review of the
Shaheen 1 programme – an increasingly sophisticated more customized approach towards the
development of Pakistan’s India-centric missile capability.
64 1 image of the 1st launch, 3 images of the 2nd launch and 4 images of the 3rd launch were available. 2 of the images of the 4th
launch do not give measurements that are consistent with the other images. These 2 images have been taken out.
65 Length includes the interface with the rocket.
66 Includes the nozzle and the stage interface.
67 Includes the nozzle and the fin.
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The 1st stage of the Shaheen 2 missiles though shorter than the stages of the Shaheen 1 are still
longer than the stage lengths we measured for the M9 missiles. This substantiates the argument
that Pakistan has internalized the transfer of technology and can system engineer the developments
that it needs. Staging represents a substantial leap forward in terms of technology.
We can also see that the rocket motor length of the 2nd stage (2.08 to 2.25 m) is close to half the
length of the rocket motor of the 1st stage (4.36 to 4.45m). These measurements can be used to
estimate the quantities of propellants carried by the 1st and 2nd stages. From these the stage masses
can also be estimated.68 Using the stage masses, the lift off weight of the missile can be computed
for various payloads. This works out to be 8134 kg for a payload mass of 1000 kg.
Using these values we estimated the cut off velocity of the 2-stage Shaheen 2. Range, time of flight
and altitude reached were then estimated both for a 1000 kg and a 700 kg payload. The range is
shown pictorially in Figure 7.
The range of the Shaheen 2 missile with payloads of 700 and 1000 kg is 851 km
and 1136 km. The flight times and apogee altitudes for the 700 kg and 1000 kg
cases are 506 seconds, 582 seconds, 245 km and 312 km respectively.
We can see that the much smaller 2 stage Shaheen 2 missile performs much better than the much
larger single stage Ghauri missile.
As we know from our analysis of the Shaheen 1, Pakistan has a much bigger booster for the
Shaheen 1. If this larger Shaheen 1 booster is coupled with the second stage of the flown Shaheen
2 we would expect a significant improvement in range. We have so far not seen any evidence of
this new configuration. It could, however, be developed. Such a Shaheen 2 variant will have a
range of at least 1142 km and 1489 km with a 1000 kg and 700 kg payload respectively.69
Figure 8 depicts the range for this improved Shaheen 2 variant.
Though the variant we are talking about is not seen we can see that a combination of existing
stages can provide Pakistan with a missile that can reach almost all parts of India. What has been
seen in the 3 tests of the Shaheen 2 is only a limited version of the potential capability. Once stage
separation has been mastered Pakistan can quickly build up the capability to deploy a larger
68 From the image the length of the propellant grain of stage 1 works out to be 3.35 m which for a 1 metre diameter can
accommodate 3802 kg of propellant with a first stage mass of 4752 kg. The 2nd stage propellant mass works out to be 1905 kg
with a stage 2 mass of 2382 kg. For a 1000 kg payload the lift off mass works out to be 8134 kg.
69 We have not carried out a detailed trajectory analysis for the variant but extrapolated from the Shaheen 2 data. One would
expect to see a range greater than the one quoted here if a separate trajectory was run.
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variant of the Shaheen 2.70 It is our view that Pakistan can do this with or without Chinese help.
Deployment of the Shaheen 2 may start by the end of 2007 since 3 test flights
have already taken place. During this phase the limited capabilities of the Ghauri and the
Shaheen 1 may be enough to take care of nuclear deterrence against an Indian pre-emptive
strike.
70 If this logic (which we have seen in the testing phase of Shaheen 1) is to be considered valid, one would expect to see a longer






































































































































An Overview of Pakistan’s Missile Capability
We summarise below the conclusions we can make from this technical study of Pakistan’s missile
arsenal.71
Table 7: Pakistan Missile Overview
Ghaznavi 269 km 347 km yes Deployed Shortened Chinese M11. Nuclear warheads
may be transferred to  longer range missiles
Shaheen 1 410 km 495 km yes Deployed Based on the Chinese M9. Longer rocket
motor. System engineering capability
Ghauri 818 km 928 km yes Deployed North Korean technology. Liquid rocket. KRL
management. Some failures
Shaheen 2 851 km 1136 km yes Service in 2 stage missile. Significant capability.
2008  Deployment in 2008










It is well known that there are two groups within Pakistan looking at nuclear weapons and
delivery vehicles. The Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) originally headed by A.Q. Khan is credited
with Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear capability. They have been responsible for the Ghauri missile.
The technology for this liquid fuelled missile was acquired from North Korea. The other group
involved operates under the purview of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). They
have been responsible for the development of solid rockets and missiles that include the Abdali,
Ghaznavi, Shaheen 1 and the two-stage Shaheen 2 missiles. These groups had been working in
parallel with independent control over both the development of missiles and warheads.
Based on our analysis the credibility and capability of the solid rocket group appears to be much
better than their liquid rocket counterparts. As we have said earlier some of the claims on the
Ghauri are not consistent with the available evidence. There are also problems with some of the
images of the Ghauri that have been put out in the public domain. By contrast the solid group
claims are more consistent. The rhetoric from them has been much more guarded and restrained.
It is our view that major improvements in capability are more likely from this group.
As a part of our study we also carried out a technical evaluation of Pakistan capabilities in
producing solid rocket motors in reasonable numbers. Both French and Chinese transfer of
technology has happened. Our view is that much of this technology has been internalized and we
71 We have not included the Abdali because it is a tactical missile.
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think Pakistan would be in a position to build a new facility geared towards its operational strategic
requirements. Whether it will do so or will it rely on its existing facilities is a moot point. An
assessment of this is provided in a separate NIAS report which complements this report.72
However these perceived differences between two warring groups should not blind us to the
capabilities of both the liquid fuelled and solid fuelled missiles in Pakistan’s growing arsenal. Both
the Ghauri and the Shaheen 1 have demonstrated capabilities and should be taken seriously by
strategic planners and thinkers within India. The successful flights of the 2-stage Shaheen 2 will
soon make most of India vulnerable to a Pakistani attack.
In view of its reliability the Ghaznavi will still be the most operational of the Pakistani missiles.
A significant number of Ghaznavi missiles would have been equipped to carry nuclear warheads.
As the Shaheen 1 and the Ghauri become operational some of the Ghaznavi warheads may be
reconfigured to fit them. This is logical given that enriched uranium resources available to Pakistan
may be limited. In such a situation one would expect a shift in priorities to missiles and warheads
that can strike deeper into enemy territory.
After the departure of A.Q. Khan there is a possibility that some re-organisation and rationalization
of the work being carried on by two independent groups will take place. Under President
Musharraf’s regime these may not create any major problems though it may create some
bureaucratic turf battles.
The pace of launches and tests also indicates a major Pakistani commitment to create as quickly
as possible a credible minimum deterrence that can target most of India. This focus and
acceleration may be due to Pakistan’s (President Musharraf) obsession on achieving strategic
parity with India.
Information is now available from official sources or semi-official web sites about Pakistani
capabilities and achievements. This is in sharp contrast to earlier practice. This may indicate a
shift in thinking - from a tactical knee jerk kind of thinking - towards a more strategic rational
view of India. Pakistan wants India and the rest of the world to know that it can protect itself
against any pre-emptive attack that will deny it strategic parity.  We believe based on our analysis
that Pakistan will soon have within the next few years the capability to target most of India.
The maps provide additional information on current and projected capabilities of Pakistan’s
missiles.
72 An analysis of Pakistan’s Missile Production Capacity. NIAS report (forthcoming)
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Implications of Pakistani Missile Capability for India
A self-contained nuclear warhead in the context of Pakistan is presumed to have a mass of between
700 and 1000 kg. As we can see from the attached maps the various Pakistani missiles have
different ranges.
The Abdali missile (a variant of the Hatf 1 the first missile to be developed by Pakistan) has a
range of 85 to 95 km with a 500 kg payload. With a heavier nuclear payload the range would be
even less. In the context of India and Pakistan these missiles may not have a strategic role –
though they would be used as tactical missiles during a conflict. Given their very short ranges it is
unlikely that these missiles would carry nuclear warheads. This is particularly so in the context of
limited supplies of enriched uranium. Our assessment rules out the Abdali as a strategic
nuclear threat to India.
The first of the Pakistani missiles to pose a strategic threat to India is the Ghaznavi missile - a
modified version of the Chinese M11 missile. Their range with a 700 to 1000 kg payload covers at
least 3 major cities – Srinagar, Chandigarh, Ahmedabad and maybe the outer perimeters of the
Delhi urban area. There is little doubt that significant numbers of these missiles have been
transferred to Pakistan by China. Pakistan is also capable of producing them in some numbers.
We would expect that there are at least a 100 of these missiles available to Pakistan. It is quite
likely that Pakistan can produce them in reasonable numbers – maybe 15 to 20 a year.73
At the time Pakistan first acquired them (the early 1990s) many of them would have been capable
of carrying a nuclear payload. It is also possibly the most reliable and most tested missile in the
arsenal in view of its Chinese pedigree. As other longer range more capable missiles become
available (the Shaheen 1, the Ghauri and the Shaheen 2) it is likely the nuclear warheads that
were Ghaznavi compatible would be moved to fit into the other missiles. In spite of these moves
one would still expect that a certain minimum number of Ghaznavi missiles would be nuclear
capable because of reliability considerations. Keeping in mind potential targets (cities, big towns)
we should expect at least 10 of these missiles to be carrying nuclear warheads. As other missiles
become operational and if enriched uranium were in short supply the nuclear warheads could be
moved out of the Ghaznavi into the more capable longer-range missiles.
There have been 7 launches of the Shaheen 1 missile including a possible nuclear version. The
missile – a longer stretched version of the Chinese M9 missile – can be termed to have become
73 These are our best estimates based on our study. Pakistan has in place a French supplied plant for the production of 560 mm
propellant grains. This can be improved to produce larger grains.
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operational. Put in a simpler way the nuclear tipped version of the missile can be used in the case
of India Pakistan standoff today. In addition to the major cities of Srinagar, Chandigarh, and
Ahmedabad, the Shaheen 1 can also definitely target parts of Delhi and its environs. Jaipur would
also fall within its range. A large number of other mini cities and large towns would be covered.
Based on the developments we have seen in the last 5 or 6 years deployment should have started
in 2002. They may have about 20 missiles in the inventory and maybe about 10 of them could
have a nuclear payload.74
The Ghauri missile has been tested 7 times since its first launch in 1998. It is a liquid fuelled
rocket – carrying nitric acid and kerosene as oxidizer and fuel. It is clearly and unambiguously
North Korean in origin. In spite of some anomalies in reports of its capabilities and testing, the
evidence indicates that it has been successful in many of its 7 launches. In the event of a standoff
and a nuclear confrontation it can be deployed. More recent estimates of range indicate that its
actual performance may be slightly lower than earlier estimates. In addition to the cities of Srinagar,
Chandigarh, Delhi, Jaipur and Ahmedabad, the cities of Mumbai, Pune, Nagpur, Bhopal and
Lucknow could fall within the range of the Ghauri.
Since the Ghauri is liquid fuelled and uses corrosive and difficult to handle liquids – kerosene and
nitric acid - the mobile launcher will have to be accompanied by separate tankers carrying the
nitric acid and the kerosene fuel. The fuelling operation would also take some time maybe 1 to 2
hours during which the missile would be vulnerable. As easier-to-launch solid fuelled rockets
become available these missiles may be phased out. We expect North Korea to have supplied
Pakistan with at least 15 to 20 complete missiles as part of the technology deal. We also believe
that Pakistan can produce about 5 to 8 missiles annually. Based on the schedule of observed
launches an arsenal of about 30 missiles with about 15 of them being able to carry nuclear
warheads would be a reasonable assessment of Pakistani capability.75
The Shaheen 2 is a two-stage solid fuelled rocket. It significantly enhances Pakistan’s capabilities.
3 launches have taken place. The public evidence indicates that the launches seem to have been
successful. Estimates of the range of the launched missile indicate all targets up to and including
Hyderabad could fall within its range. The 3 launches of the Shaheen 2 used only a smaller
Shaheen 1st stage. Pakistan has a bigger Shaheen 1 booster. If this was used as the 1st stage the
range can increase further and even cities like Bangalore would be vulnerable. This Shaheen 2
variant is not visible yet.
74 Based on a separate NIAS study that looks at production capabilities for the Shaheen 1 and 2. This study takes into account the
cast cure cycle of propellant grains and the production of rocket casings. Pakistan has another production facility for the
production of larger 1 m grains for the Shaheen 1 and 2 programmes.
75 Our estimate based on our production study.
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The threat to India in the event of a nuclear stand off
❏ 10 Ghaznavi out of maybe about 100 missiles
❏ 10 Shaheen 1 missiles out of maybe 25 in inventory
❏ 15 Ghauri missiles out of maybe an inventory of 30 missiles
❏ A few Shaheen 2 missiles maybe 2 to 3 by 2008.
In spite of any possible counter-measures they could cause significant damage to India.
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The National Security and Strategic Decision-Making
System of Pakistan
The Organisation of the National Command Authority
There was an urgent need for Pakistan to establish an effective Command and Control Organisation
over its nuclear weapons because of various international concerns in the immediate aftermath
of the 1998 nuclear tests. Pakistan’s nuclear command and control system formalises the roles to
be played by the top military commanders in making decisions on the use of nuclear weapons.
This system is very different from the system in India where the military has only a secondary role
to play. Pakistan’s defence authorities began organising a formal nuclear planning system and
inter-service chain of command in early 1999. On February 7, 2000, Pakistan announced the
establishment of a comprehensive command and control structure called the Strategic Command
Organisation. This has three components - the National Command Authority (NCA), the Strategic
Plans Division (SPD), and the Strategic Forces Commands (SFC). Figure 9 provides an overview
of the organisation of the Strategic Command Organisation of Pakistan. Based on this structure
it is reasonable to assume that Pakistan has a well thought out operational strategic nuclear
doctrine.
The NCA is responsible for the employment and deployment aspects of the nuclear force. It
coordinates the development activities of strategic organisations, deals with arms control and
disarmament matters, oversees the implementation of export controls and takes care of the safety
and security of nuclear installations and materials. Each of the three services (the Army, the Air
Force and the Navy) has its respective strategic force command. However, operational control
over these strategic forces remains with the NCA. The Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which acts
as the secretariat for the NCA, performs the overall coordination and control functions.
The final authority to launch a nuclear strike is dependent upon consensus within the NCA with
the Chairman casting the final vote. At weapon launch sites the 2-3 man rule, codes, progressive
alert status, etc., will be employed. Pakistan does not have a ‘launch on warning’ posture.76
The NCA responsibilities include policy formulation as well as the use and the development of
strategic weapons systems. It is the chief decision-making body and operates under the
chairmanship of the President. The Prime Minister is the Vice Chairman. The NCA has two
committees operating under its ambit – the Employment Control Committee and the Development
Control Committee.
76 Mahmud Ali Durrani, "Pakistan's Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons", Occasional Paper No. 37 (Sandia
National Laboratories: USA), p. 24
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The Employment Control Committee (ECC) can be thought of as the external or international
face of the NCA. Its function is largely related to justifying to the international community the
rationale and purpose behind the use or potential use of nuclear weapons. One can assume that
it would convene in a crisis to decide on suitable responses. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of
the ECC are the President and the Prime Minister respectively. The Foreign Minister is designated
as the Deputy Chairman of the ECC and may chair most meetings of the Committee. The ECC also
includes cabinet ministers of defence, finance, interior, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Committee (CJCSC), the military chiefs, the head of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD)77 and technical
advisors.
The Development Control Committee (DCC) is the real power behind the formulation and
implementation of the nuclear weapon use and deployment policy. It is responsible for the
development and production of nuclear weapons, their related delivery systems and other support
equipment.  The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the DCC are the President and the Prime Minister
respectively. The CJCSC is the Deputy Chairman of the DCC and may chair most sessions of the
Committee. The other members are predominantly from the military and technical cadres and
include the chiefs of all the 3 services. Representatives and heads of important technology
organisations could also be members of the DCC.
It is clear from the broad responsibilities outlined that the SPD is a crucial and important part of
the NCA. Figure 10 provides some details about the responsibilities and the structure of the SPD.
The SPD is headed by a Director General from the Army and comprises officers from the three
services. The SPD has five Directorates:
❏ Operations and Strategic Plans Directorate
❏ Strategic Weapons Development Directorate
❏ The C4I2SR Directorate (Command, Control, Communication, Computer Information,
❏ Surveillance and Reconnaissance)
❏ Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate
❏ Consultancy Directorate
The SPD also has a cell called the Strategic Forces Command Planning (SFC) cell responsible for
dealing with issues related to the use of nuclear weapons by the three services.
77 The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) provides secretarial support to the NCA and handles all issues related to the nation's nuclear
capability. The SPD functions directly under the President, the PM and the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. It is
headed by a Director General from the Army and comprises officers from the three services.
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We can therefore see that the SPD handles all aspects of the strategic programme on behalf of
NCA.
The SPD
❏ formulates the country’s nuclear policy, nuclear strategy and nuclear doctrine;
❏ formulates short and long-term development strategy and force goals for the strategic forces
of the Army, Navy and the Air Force;
❏ formulates strategic and operational plans for the movement, and deployment of strategic
forces of the three services;
❏ adopts measures for the safety and security of strategic assets;
❏ assists the President, Prime Minister, and the CJCSC in exercising control over strategic
organisations and coordinating their financial, technical, developmental, and administrative
aspects;
❏ provides military inputs to the Foreign Office and through them to the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) in Geneva on international / regional arms control regimes, disarmament
and related strategic issues; and
❏ coordinates and ensures the establishment of Strategic C4I2SR system (Command, Control,
Communication, Computer Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) for the NCA for
command and control of strategic assets with real-time linkages to the Services and Strategic
Forces.
The third constituent of the management structure of the Strategic Command Organisation is
the Strategic Forces Command. These are being raised as an important unit in all three services.
The services retain training, technical and administrative control over their Strategic Forces.
However, operational planning and control rests with the NCA under the overall military direction
of the CJCSC via the SPD. The SPD coordinates all related aspects with service headquarters. The
SPD seems to be the new power centre in Pakistan especially after 2000.
This structure, after providing for adequate discussions amongst interested parties, gives ultimate
responsibility for decisions on the use of nuclear weapons to the head of government. Figures
11a and 11b also shows that the Army exercises oversight and control over the various entities
of the NCA. It is clear that the Army controls and dictates the formulation and implementation of
policy related to the development, deployment and use of nuclear weapons. Figure 11a explicitly
describes the organisation related issue during the pre–Musharaaf pre-Pokharan period. After
Musharaaf became President, the scientific organisations associated with the strategic capabilities
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of Pakistan have seen significant changes. A.Q. Khan and Ishaq Ahmed, the heads of KRL and
PAEC respectively have been ousted and replaced with other more pliable heads.78 A new
organisation called the National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) vested with
the responsibility for missile development has been set up.79 There also seem to be a closer
integration between KRL (liquid propellant) and National Development Council (solid propellant)
programmes. The PAEC seems to have emerged as the more powerful technological entity after
this re-organisation. The spate of missile tests after a lull in 2001 and 2002, seems to indicate that
the re-organisation has been effective and is working out well.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine – Ambiguity of Use the Key
Pakistan’s nuclear strategy and operational planning are under the control of the military. The
officials and key policy makers in Pakistan made general statements during 1998 – 99 describing
Pakistan’s strategy as “minimum nuclear deterrence”. However, unlike India, they did not make a
“no-first-use” pledge. Pakistan cites India as its sole nuclear threat. Given Pakistan’s conventional
military inferiority, lack of strategic depth and its relatively smaller stockpile of nuclear weapons,
survivability of its forces must be a top priority.80 As the weaker side in the highly asymmetrical
conventional military balance, and the less asymmetrical nuclear balance, Pakistani planners are
likely to conclude that only the threat of an ambiguous first-strike option will provide maximum
nuclear deterrent credibility. Pakistan’s weakness means a first-strike doctrine cannot annihilate
India at this point in time. Instead it is intended to signal that escalation to crossing the threshold
may not be gradual but sudden and extreme, with catastrophic consequences for India. Even if
Pakistani planners operationally define the “red lines” that would set nuclear strike preparations
in motion they would not publicly acknowledge these thresholds. Ambiguity, in their view, would
contribute to deterrence and stability.81
This assessment seems to have been borne out. In January 2002, General Kidwai, Head of the SPD
was interviewed by Italian non-proliferation researchers from the Landau Network – Centro
Volta.82 Kidwai said that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are stored in a disassembled state but can be
assembled “very quickly.” He added that Pakistan had no interest in developing battlefield nuclear
weapons for artillery.
78 More recently Karim Ahmed and Anwar Ali are reported to have become heads of KRL and the PAEC replacing J.A Mirza and
Pervez Butt.
79 NESCOM is headed by Dr. Samar Mubarak Mand who appears to have become more powerful with responsibility for a closer and
better knit missile development programme.
80 Rodney Jones, "Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Quest For Assured Nuclear Deterrence - A Conjecture," Institute of Regional Studies,
Islamabad, Pakistan, January 2000.
81 Hussain Haqqani, "Withdraw the Indian Threat of War," International Herald Tribune, 11 June 2002.
82 Maurizio Martellini, Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, "Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan," January 2002
(www.landaunetwork.org)
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Moving on to the issue of deterrence Kidwai said, “In case deterrence fails, they (nuclear weapons)
will be used if:
❏ India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory
❏ India destroys a large part of either Pakistan’s land or air forces
❏ India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan
❏ India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large-scale “internal
subversion.”
Questioned about the stability of this strategy, Kidwai stated that India and Pakistan would follow
“rational decision making” and stay away from the nuclear threshold. He added that Pakistan
does not currently plan to develop and publicize a nuclear doctrine like the draft one released by
India in 1999.
Power Politics – the Dominant Role of the Army
Over all, the military in Pakistan is the most powerful institution and has been called the backbone
of the nation.83 The primary reason for the military’s emergence as the most influential element
in defence decision-making lies in the significant role it plays in the country’s power politics. The
military in Pakistan has always taken the responsibility of guarding Islamic ideological identity
and safeguarding its frontiers and borders. The defence decision-making circle is characterised
by the presence of a strong pro-military lobby. It is also very clear that the Pakistan Army has
enjoyed more influence in policy matters than the other two services and the office of the Chief of
the Army Staff has emerged as the focal point of power. He calls the shots not only in military
matters but also in political and ideological matters. He is the piper who plays the tune that others
march to. The reason for the military’s emergence as the most influential element in defence
decision-making lies in its significance in the country’s power politics. It assumed the responsibility
of guarding Islamic ideological identity and the frontiers of the country.84
The Army’s influence has also prevented the other services (the Air Force and the Navy) from
exercising influence during their tenure as JCSC. The institution of JCSC was founded primarily
with the political aim of curbing and curtailing the Army’s influence on Pakistan’s power politics.
The plan never succeeded because of the dependence of all ruling regimes on the Army for their
political survival. In 1999 the Chairmanship of the JCSC was given to the Army bypassing the
83 There is a general consensus on this fact among academics in Pakistan.
84 Ayesha Siddiqa - Agha, "Pakistan's Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979 - 1999: In Search of a Policy", (Sang-e-Meel
Publication: Lahore, 2003), p. 56
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Navy’s turn to head this influential office. The position of Chairman JCSC was given to the Army
Chief, General Pervez Musharaf, an action, which made the Army dominant once again in the
decision making process. As we now know the rest is history.
The Pakistani Army’s predominant position in power politics and policy-making can also be
attributed to certain personalities such as General Zia-ul-Haq. During his rule the Army’s power
over political matters increased even though it also perpetuated the imbalance between the Army
and the other services. Zia’s regime was also instrumental in enhancing the image of the Army
chief in Pakistan’s decision-making process and politics.
The nuclear and missile organizations in Pakistan are not formally a part of the military
establishment. However, the entire establishment works very closely with the Pakistani Army. As
mentioned earlier, the Army in Pakistan is also the dominant factor in nuclear decision-making.
The nuclear weapons programme codenamed ‘Project 706’ has always been under the command
of the Army.85
The Power and Functions of the Civilian Bureaucracy in Pakistan
The civilian departments involved in defence decision-making are:
❏ The Ministry of Defence (MOD)
❏ The Ministry of Finance (MOF)
❏ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
These ministries play a subordinate role to the military bureaucracy in matters related to strategic
decision-making. This aspect is clearly seen in the allocation of roles and responsibilities between
the Employment Committee of the NCA and the Development Committee of the NCA. The
Employment Committee, which has a large number of civilians with the Foreign Minister as the
Deputy Chairman, is directed by the Development Committee under Army control.
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) organisational structure has been designed to make sure the
military role in matters related to defence and strategy remains firmly under the control of the
military. Serving and retired military officials are posted and given important positions in the
Ministry so that they can control and also help in fulfilling the demands of the defence establishment.
The two additional secretaries in the defence production division, and the three in the defence
85 Ibid; p. 67
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division, are posted to the MOD from the three services of the armed forces. These important
second in command positions enable the military to manipulate the largely subordinate civilian
workforce involved in various defence related activities and industries. It was argued that such
things would help in easing the problems that civilian bureaucrats might encounter in
understanding the military’s strategic requirements. This implicitly assumes that civilian officials
of the Ministry were not capable of handling military affairs on their own. Pakistan has always
had a culture where the political decision-making culture has been dominated by the military.
The other important Ministry is Foreign Affairs. However, the history in Pakistan shows no record
of the military consulting this Ministry on defence and strategy related issues. The Foreign Office
in Pakistan is rarely consulted in matters pertaining to military planning. The Kargil imbroglio is
cited as an example of the communication gap between the Foreign Office and the military
establishment.86
The third important Ministry in the civilian bureaucracy in Pakistan is the Ministry of Finance
(MOF). The MOF controls the purse strings of the defence establishment. However, this Ministry
cannot override decisions taken by the military. The decision taken by the Pak Army usually prevails.
Administrative control of the armed forces and general military planning are areas where the
armed forces do not allow any interference.
Other actors also play an indirect but very important role in building the influence of the military.
These are - the military intelligence agencies, the religious fundamentalist groups and the media.
The Role of the Intelligence Agencies and the ISI
Pakistan’s military intelligence agencies have played a significant role in its politics. They have
also been involved with Pakistan’s forays into Afghanistan and Central Asia. Though each of the
three services has its own intelligence branch, the key role in the internal and external politics of
Pakistan is played by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The power and influence of the ISI has
increased substantially since the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. The ISI and the Army
have often collaborated to further their mutual interests. In the ‘Mehran’ Bank scandal, money
from the bank was given to the ISI to destabilise Z.A.Bhutto’s government. The chief executive of
the bank, Yunis Habib, admitted that he had provided General Mirza Aslam Baig, the then Army
Chief and the ISI with fourteen million rupees to be used for manipulating the 1990 elections.87
86 Ibid; p. 72.
87 Ibid; p. 76
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The Army controls the ISI. In spite of the ISI chief being appointed by the Prime Minister, the core
of its personnel is drawn from the Army. This provides the Army chief with substantial leverage in
using the institution to serve the greater organisational interest of the armed forces.
Robustness of Nuclear Command and Control Systems
It is true that the people involved in the nuclear establishment in Pakistan are formally not a part of the
military bureaucracy. But at the same time, the nuclear establishment works in tandem with the Army,
which plays a dominant and important role in nuclear decision-making. The linkages between the
nuclear establishment and the Army can be understood from historical evidence. There was an
upsurge in the number of Army officers posted at Kahuta especially after Zia’s take over of the country.
As discussed earlier, the Strategic Command Organisation consists of three constituents – the
NCA, the SPD and the SFC. This structure of the Nuclear Command Authority makes it highly
unlikely that an unauthorised use of nuclear weapons will occur. The linkages between all the
constituents and the norms and procedures that will be followed provide for a robust and stringent
command and control system. However, this robust design per se does not rule out the possibility
of accidental war in the Indo-Pak context.
As we can see from the above details, Pakistan has in place a reasonably rugged system to ensure
that nuclear weapons will be used only after due authorisation of a central command authority.
There are enough check and balances in terms of organisation design that preclude inadvertent
and accidental use. Currently the military and more specifically the Army is in charge. The command
to use nuclear weapons can only come after clearance by the highest authority and is implemented
through the SPD bypassing the individual authority of the Army, Navy or the Air Force. This is, of
course, a positive sign that makes accidental war less likely and the system more robust.
While this part of the security apparatus appears to be moving along the right lines other parts of
the security system though not directly connected to the nuclear command authority could create
conditions that could threaten the nuclear status quo. India has witnessed two major crisis points
in its post-Pokhran relationship with Pakistan. One was the mini war over Pakistani incursion
into Kargil and the other was the confrontation between the forces of the two sides along the
border as the consequence of terrorists attack on India’s Parliament. There is also the recurrent
problem of terrorism in Kashmir which showed a very pronounced intensification just prior to the
border confrontation between the two sides. The ISI and the Army which runs the ISI appear to
be a parallel power centre whose actions could create a problem that could spiral into a potential
conflict. These crises situations have raised questions about the stability of deterrence in the
sub-continent. This is the issue that we would like to address in our next section.
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Issues related to Deterrence and Stability
Ballistic missiles in Pakistan as in other countries serve as both potential war-fighting weapons as
well as delivery systems for nuclear weapons. There is a clear linkage between nuclear deterrence
and ballistic missile capability. The military capability of any nation is critical to deterrence, whether
it is based on conventional or on nuclear weapons. For example, George Fernandes, India’s former
Defence Minister, made the following statement on April 23, 1999 “The acquisition of a missile
system capable of delivering conventional or nuclear warhead bridges a key gap in the nuclear deterrent
profile of the country. The double distinction of being a nuclear-capable and possessor of the means of
delivery means that India can hold its head high without fear of being bullied in a hostile security
environment. China with its vast nuclear arsenal, Pakistan with its nuclear weapons and delivery
system capability, America perching in Diego Garcia and 8 other Asian countries possessing missiles
is quite a grim security scenario.” 88
In the formative stages of the US-Soviet nuclear competition, deterrence theorists identified a
stability-instability paradox associated with the acquisition of offsetting nuclear weapon capabilities.
The essence of this paradox was that nuclear weapons were supposed to stabilise relations between
adversaries, and to foreclose a major war between them. At the same time, offsetting nuclear
capabilities might well increase instability by encouraging provocations and conflict at lower
levels – precisely because nuclear weapons would presumably provide protection against
escalation.89
Many observers of South Asia have accepted Kenneth Waltz’s position and have argued that the
nuclear weapons force India and Pakistan to adopt a more cautious, less bellicose approach
toward each other.90 In their view, the possibility of large – scale, deliberate conventional conflict
between the two States has lessened considerably, and nuclear deterrence ultimately will compel
restraint, de-escalation, and disengagement on both sides.91 Other scholars in India, Pakistan
and the USA have argued that nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation will increase the likelihood
of crises, accidents, and nuclear war.92
88 Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Internet: www.nic.in/india-image/pib/f230499.html and also quoted by
Joseph Cirincione in his paper on "Indian Missile Deployments and the Reactions from China", Jane's Defence Review, May 1999,
p. 3.
89 Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., The Stability -Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia,
Report no. 38, June 2001 (The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C.), Internet: www.stimson.org
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The recent crises in the Indian subcontinent have tested nuclear deterrence theory against the
complex realities in South Asia. These crises have also renewed a debate on the viability and
feasibility of nuclear deterrence and the role of ballistic missiles in Southern Asia. The South
Asian context is quite different and in some ways more volatile than the historic U.S. – Soviet
rivalry. The nuclear historian Scott Sagan notes that India and Pakistan have more in common
than the Americans and the Soviets, who were on opposite sides of the globe and viewed each
others as mysterious, often unpredictable adversaries. In contrast to the subcontinent, the U.S.
and Soviet rivalry was ideological without disputed territory and a history of armed conflict.93
Operationally the U.S. and Soviet Union maintained large nuclear-armed missile and bomber
forces on hair-trigger alert status while both India and Pakistan separate delivery systems and
nuclear weapons providing a stabilising delay.
The fear of retaliation is central to the concept of deterrence. One view could be that Pakistan
seems to be losing this fear as exemplified by its 1999 Kargil incursion. Pakistan has never declared
a no-first-use policy and there is a growing fear in India about the threshold at which Pakistan
might like to use nuclear weapons. India must therefore avoid putting Pakistan into situations
where it feels it has no alternative but to use its nuclear weapons. During the 2002 crisis (which
lasted for more than ten months), India restrained herself from undertaking ‘hot pursuits’ in
Pakistan–occupied Kashmir despite a number of provocative Pakistani actions.94 Thus India’s
over-reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence, combined with a no-first-use policy, actually
seems to be adversely impacting its strategic choices.
Nuclearisation of South Asia has not yet brought about a period of détente and stability between
India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan have had continuing skirmishes, a small war, and a near-
war since they went overtly nuclear in May 1998. Although, there was a brief period of détente
represented by the Lahore summit of February 1999, the “spirit of Lahore Declaration” was crushed
by the Kargil conflict of June 1999 and disputes have grown more intense and more frequent
since then. Hence, Kenneth Waltz’s argument of stability does not appear to be applicable within
the context of India and Pakistan.95 However, deterrence has to be demonstrable to be effective.
The current level of mistrust between India and Pakistan could be an obstacle to the creation of
a stable deterrence. The ongoing peace moves and talks seem to be reducing the existing mistrust.
This could lead towards a more stable scenario between the two countries.96
93 Scott Sagan, ‘The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia”, Asian Survey, v. XLI, N. 6, 2001.
94 Arvind Kumar, “Nuclear Deterrence: Waning Motif”, Deccan Herald, August 22, 2002.
95 Kenneth Waltz, n. 91.
96 Whether current problems between India and Pakistan are transients towards a more stable position or are indicative of inherent
instability is an open question for discussion.
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Will the nuclearisation of the sub-continent stabilise the confrontation between both sides and
reduce the threat of all kinds of wars? Or will it actually promote the testing of each other’s will
and resolve through a series of continuing skirmishes and conflicts on the assumption that neither
side could afford to escalate the problem to war? Which of these perspectives is the right one?
Are There Any Alternatives to Deterrence ?
The information available (substantiated in this study) indicates that Pakistan may have currently
about 35 to 40 nuclear tipped missiles in its arsenal. The ranges of these missiles vary from about
300 kms to about 1200 kms. Missiles with larger range could also be under development. Pakistan
will add to this arsenal as nuclear material to make bombs becomes available. While some of the
nuclear weapons may currently be carried on aircraft one would expect a larger fraction of them
to move to a missile basing. The fact that the missiles of both India and Pakistan are designed for
mobility makes it unlikely that a pre-emptive first strike by either side would completely eliminate
the threat of retaliation. Even with the current arsenal of about 40, Pakistan would be in a position
to inflict considerable damage on India even if some of these 40 missiles were taken out in a first
strike by India. The same can be said of Pakistani attempts to take out the Indian arsenal. This is
the classic two-person game where the payoffs for the two strategies of pre-emptive strike and
deterrence can be represented as a 2 by 2 matrix. We can easily see that both [pre-empt,
pre-empt] and [deterrence, deterrence] are Nash equilibria when the strategies of both parties
are taken together. Thus in the early period after both countries went nuclear, possibilities of
either country tilting towards pre-emption  are as likely as the expected tilt towards deterrence. If
we bring in fear, mistrust, lack of communication and complex national security systems with







Bad for India,  bad for Pakistan
(Nash equilibrium)
Bad but not so bad for India, very bad
for Pakistan
Deterrence Very bad for India, bad but not so bad
for Pakistan
Good for India, Good for Pakistan
(Nash equilibrium)
organisational agendas different from the national agenda, there is a fairly strong case for a
[ pre-emption, pre-emption]  strategy to influence strategic thinking on both sides. Such possibilities
are more likely in the immediate period after two countries go nuclear as some parties on both
sides may want to test the other side’s resolve. This would be the period of greatest risk. Both
Kargil and the standoff along the border triggered by a terrorist attack on India’s Parliament can
be seen as evidence of a move towards an unfavourable [pre-emption, pre-emption] Nash
equilibrium. The possibility that threats and counter-threats that are a part of such moves - could
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either by default or accident - trigger something more serious is certainly a concern during this
early period.
As time goes by and both countries and their leaders become aware of the real risks, it is likely
that both countries will move away from the [pre-emption, pre-emption] strategy towards a
[deterrence, deterrence] strategy. Though the choice of (deterrence by India, deterrence by
Pakistan) would be the best for both parties one cannot automatically assume that this will be the
immediate logical outcome of the game. Both countries will have to work hard to make sure that
the desirable outcome of deterrence is reached.
How do these concepts translate into practice on issues of war and peace between India and
Pakistan? If we assume that India has about a 100 missiles that can reach Pakistan and Pakistan
has about 40 missiles that can reach India and if we assume that pre-emption on both sides is
equally effective at about 50%97, a nuclear war between the two sides would transform the
conceptual matrix shown above into something like the one below. If India attacks first, 20 Pakistani
missiles would hit Indian targets and all 100 Indian missiles would hit Pakistani targets. If Pakistan
attacks first then 40 Pakistan missiles will hit Indian targets and 50 Indian missiles will hit Pakistani
targets. If both countries fear pre-emption from the other side they could both launch missiles very
quickly. In such a situation we could expect that the damage to both sides would be very high.98
The strategy of pre-emptive strike and deterrence adopted by either India or Pakistan can be
understood by a two-by-two matrix99 in a game theory model. As mentioned above if both India
and Pakistan go in for pre-emptive strikes (attacking industrial centers and military installations)
then there would be heavy casualties on both sides. The largest concentrations of industrial centers
in India are in Maharashtra and Gujarat and in Pakistan they are around Karachi and Lahore. It
is estimated that if both countries choose to use a 15 KT device (Hiroshima type of bomb), then
the expected casualties in India would be around 13 millions and it would be 33 millions deaths
in Pakistan. The studies100 have shown that about one third of the population become casualties if
a 15 KT device is used.
97 A pre-emptive strike will destroy 50% of the enemy's arsenal.
98 We can assume different probabilities and generate a variety of scenarios. Except in the very early stages of a weapons build up
where there is a window of potential vulnerability retaliation may always be expected.
99 The assumption made here is that each location will have a vulnerable population of 1 million people and casualties in the case
of a nuclear strike will be one third of the population. These are reasonably consistent with the Hiroshima experience. India will
target 100 locations in Pakistan and Pakistan will target 40 locations in India. All missiles will be effective in case of a
pre-emptive strike.
100 The calculations of the numbers (in terms of casualties) of deaths have been done on the basis of the following studies:
UN Study, "The Basic Framework of Disarmament", 1967; Michael E. Howard, "On Fighting a Nuclear War", International
Security (USA), Vol. 10, n. 4., 1986; William Daugherty, Barbara Levi and Frank Von Hippel, "The Consequences of "Limited"
Nuclear Attacks on the United States", International Security (USA), Vol. 10., n. 4., 1986; M.V. Ramanna, "Bombing Bombay?
Effects of Nuclear Weapons and A Case Study of a Hypothetical Explosion", IPPNW Global Health Watch, (International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War: 1999), Report no. 3.
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The matrix also suggests that if India attempts pre-emptive strike and Pakistan retaliates by second
strike then the casualties in India would be roughly 6.5 million and 33 million deaths would take
place in Pakistan.
If Pakistan chooses pre-emptive strike then there would be around 13 million deaths in India.
Under this case, India’ survivable second-strike capability would inflict damage on Pakistan. It is
estimated that around 16.5 million people would die in Pakistan.
If both the countries decide not to cross the threshold then there will not be any casualties
From the above matrix if India chooses pre-emption, both deterrence and pre-emption are equally
unattractive to Pakistan (33 million deaths in either case). A priori there is no specific reason why
Pakistan should choose deterrence especially if it fears India. Should Pakistan expect India to
follow deterrence its best response strategy is also deterrence.
By the same logic if India expects Pakistan to follow a strategy of pre-emption its best response
can either be pre-emption or deterrence. They are both equally unattractive (13 million deaths in
either case). If on the other hand India expects Pakistan to follow a strategy of deterrence its best
response would also be deterrence.
We can easily make the inference that there are two Nash equilibria as the solution to the above
payoff matrix. Both [pre-emption, pre-emption] and [deterrence, deterrence] are potential solutions
to the game. If the game is played over a single period (which we can take to mean the early
period after both countries went nuclear) there is no reason to assume a priori that the [deterrence,
deterrence] joint strategy would win over the [pre-emption, pre-emption] strategy. In the real
world the national security systems of both India and Pakistan are complex. There are multiple
organizations and multiple powerful players all pursuing agendas that may not sum up to what
is in the national interest. Their perceptions of risk of escalation may also be quite different. One
could therefore expect different parts of this complex to respond differently to problems and
crises as they emerge. Some may see deterrence while others may see pre-emption and act







13 million deaths in India, 33 million
deaths Pakistan (Nash equilibrium)
6.5 million deaths in India, 33million
deaths in Pakistan
Deterrence 13 million deaths in India16.5 million
deaths for Pakistan
0 deaths in India, 0 deaths in
Pakistan. (Nash equilibrium)
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accordingly. The security complex may also be trying to co-ordinate actions and learning how to
manage a nuclear arsenal. This period may be a particularly dangerous transition period during
which the possibility of escalation of any small problem could be quite high. Kargil and the border
standoff represent responses that typify this instability or vacillation between two Nash equilibrium
points.
As the action reaction scenario unfolds and as altered perceptions, learning and understanding
percolate through the national security complexes of both countries, one should expect a
convergence towards the more rational strategy of [deterrence, deterrence]. This is what is hopefully
happening between India and Pakistan currently. However, one should not forget that there are
two equilibrium points and there could always be the inherent danger that the national security
system on either side could easily tilt it away from a [deterrence–deterrence] strategy towards a
[pre-emption–pre-emption] strategy. Both sides should therefore endeavour to make sure that the
system stabilizes around a [deterrence, deterrence] strategy. This is the great challenge for both
India and Pakistan.
Game playing and gamesmanship and sparring for temporary short-term gains should not blind
the two countries to the fact that they are tied together by a common string that can be stretched
only so far.
A number of reports suggest that India is interested in purchasing the U.S. – Israeli developed
Arrow Missile Defence system from Israel. A number of recent reports have also suggested that
U.S. might provide BMD systems to India.101 The U.S may also provide the lower tier theatre
missile defence (TMD) system to India. TMD systems are designed to intercept missiles within the
atmosphere (using “endo-atmospheric interceptors”) and are intended to protect relatively small
areas against missiles with a range of 1000 kilometers or less.
Media reports suggest that the US would like to provide India with the Patriot PAC – 3 system. The
PAC – 3 is an upgrade of the PAC-2 Patriot missile defence system, which was unable to cope with
the inadvertent manoeuvres made by Iraqi Scud missiles during the first Gulf War. The original
Patriot interceptor has been replaced by an entirely new missile called the ERINT. The ERINT
seem to be much more manoeuvrable than the earlier Patriot interceptor and has a kinetic energy
based hit-to-kill warhead instead of an explosive warhead with a proximity fuse.
Such sales could possibly trigger a regional offensive arms race. The Israeli Arrow 2 missile system
is another option for a missile defence system. It is designed to provide terminal phase intercept
101 Refer to the reports on Indo-US NSSP agreement and Secretary Condoleeza Rice's visit to India during March 2005.
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against short and medium range ballistic missiles. It can detect and track up to 14 inbound
missiles at distances of 500 km and then intercept them at distances of between 16 to 48
kilometers.102
During May 2003, India had discussed the sale of the U.S. Patriot Advanced Capabilities-3 or
PAC-3 air and missile defence system with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage.103
This issue was raised again during Secretary Rice’s visit to India in March 2005. Discussions on
this possibility seem to have been underway with the Bush Administration since May 2002. However
nothing concrete has happened on this so far. Raytheon is yet to provide India with pricing,
availability and other related information that would be needed to begin the acquisition process.
However, a media report suggests that the U.S. has cleared the sale of Patriot missile system to
India.104
The implications of India acquiring ballistic missile defence systems have been debated among
the members of strategic community in both countries. First of all, it might erode Pakistan’s
confidence in its missile capabilities. It could also break the current state of “mutual deterrence”105
because of Pakistani fears of a pre-emptive Indian attack leading Pakistan to mate nuclear
warheads with missiles to be ready to deal with an Indian attack. Pakistan might also like to
pre-empt and employ its nuclear forces early in the conflict to penetrate defences. Even if these
doomsday scenarios are not realised will a TMD system result in a superior position for India and
will it win in a potential nuclear confrontation with Pakistan? The pay-off matrix provides an
idea of the losses that both sides may incur in such a scenario.106 We can see that there is no
alteration in two Nash equilibria from the earlier case.
The damage to India even after the deployment of TMD is not substantially different from the
earlier No TMD scenario. It is quite evident that in this scenario also the damage to both India and
Pakistan would be high. The Patriot type TMD type systems have limited defence capabilities. They
can be deployed only to protect strategic targets. Extending them to cover all vulnerable targets
including major towns and industrial centres would require a very large-scale deployment and
really major investments. There are also a number of simple fixes that Pakistan could develop to
102 Andrew Feickert and K. Alan Kronstadt, "Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia", CRS Report for Congress,
October 17, 2003, CRS-16.
103 Shishir Gupta, 'India Hopes for Patriot Nod", Indian Express (Mumbai), 23 May 2003.
104 "U.S. Clears Sale of Patriot Missile System to India", Indian Express (Bangalore), June 15, 2005.
105 Both India and Pakistan are believed to have their nuclear warheads and bombs separated from their missiles and delivery
aircraft, thus providing a degree of security from undetected first use or accidental launch.
106 The assumption made here is that India deploys TMD to protect 50 locations targeted by Pakistan. Since, Pakistan has the
capability to target 40 of India's locations, it can suitably choose locations that do not have TMD. Hence, the argument made
here is that even after deployment of TMD, the scenario would not be substantially different from the no TMD scenario.
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counter them. There are a very large number of vulnerable targets in India and a TMD even if
effective can only take care of a few of them.
We can see from the above analysis that the consequences of crossing the nuclear threshold for
these scenarios are quite high for both countries. The bogey of a potential nuclear conflict on the
sub-continent pre-supposes that India and Pakistan would behave irrationally. While there have
been ongoing crises between the two countries in the early period after both countries went
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nuclear, these have so far not led to any major nuclear confrontation - though there have been a
lot of threats and counter-threats. As the countries engage with each other and learn to live with
the nuclear reality deterrence may become the preferred approach to bilateral dealings. The post
9 / 11 environment has also had an impact with the US intervening to promote stability if needed.
The possibility of accidental war also appears to be under control. Even introduction of things
like the TMD may only raise the number of missiles and warheads but may not fundamentally
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Figure 11a: Pre -Musharraf and Pre - Pokhran Organisations in Pakistan

















Figure 11b: Post Musharraf Organisation























Appendix - Image Analysis
The Abdali Missile
There are 6 images of the Abdali missile in the data base that we have created.
An analysis of the various pictures clearly indicates a trend of improving performance and
capabilities. Early pictures of the Hatf 1 in flight (Image 1)1 indicate that it is nothing more than
a sounding rocket. The entire rocket is used for delivery of the payload. We can also see from the
nosecone side of the Hatf 1 that it is not really very well designed to handle re-entry.
In contrast Image 22 which appears to be a later picture, shows a stream lined and superior
shape. There is a clear separation between the nosecone and the main rocket motor. There is an
interface between the rocket motor and the nosecone that smoothly tapers into the warhead
section. Though not conclusive this change does indicate that the nosecone separates at some
point before re-entry. The nosecone section that would carry the warhead may also be spun up
before re-entry in order to improve the accuracy.
Images 33 and 44 are images of the Abdali taken from two different sources. As compared to
images 1 and 2 they show some stretching of the length of the missile. The rocket motor and the
warhead portion seem to have been stretched. They match the general shape of the improved
missile seen in image 2 but are longer.
Image 5 is an image5 of the missile ready for launch.
Image 6 shows the Abdali launching of February 19th 2006.6 This launch appears to be very similar
to Image 5 which is an image of the Abdali on the launch pad.
1 This image is from the report in the Pakistani newspaper Dawn reporting the launch of the Hatf 1A missile in 2000 February. See
http://www.dawn.com/2000/02/08.top1.htm
2 This is taken from the Tribune newspaper reporting the March 2003 launch of the Abdali. It may be a photo of an earlier launch.
See http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030327/world.htm#6





Measurements of some of the missile dimensions, based on a missile diameter of 0.56 m, are
provided in the Table 8 below.
Table 8: Measurements on the Abdali Missile
Image L/D ratio Length (m) Diameter Warhead + Rocket motor
(m)  interface (m)  + nozzle (m)
Image 1 7 7.84 4.39 m 0.56 m N.A N.A
Image 2 7.81 4.37 m 0.56 m 1.72 m 2.65 m
Image 3 8.76 4.90 m 0.56 m 2.02 m 2.89 m
Image 4 9.61 5.38 m 0.56 m 2.24 m 3.14 m
Image 5 11.73 6.57 m 0.56 m 2.83 m 3.73 m
Image 6 11.50 6.44 m 0.56 m 2.68 m 3.76 m
We also compared the Abdali missiles nosecone and warhead section with a typical M11 Chinese
missile. Though the Abdali missile is an indigenous programme with some French help, it is obvious
that improvements seen in the Abdali missile warhead seem to have benefited from the Chinese
connection.
The images clearly reveal an evolution in capability. Over a period of time there seems to have
been both a stretching of the rocket as well as an improvement in the warhead part of the missile.
From the early origins of a rocket motor of about 2.5 metres in length very similar to the length of
the Dauphin / Dragon technology transferred in the early 1980s, the rocket motor has been extended
to approximately 3 metres and then to less than 3.5 metres respectively for the 2 versions of the
Abdali missile that we see in the images we have analysed.
From Table 8 above there are at least 2 larger versions having lengths of approximately 5.38 and
6.57 metres. The warhead portion seems to have a length 2.24 and 2.83 metres and the rocket
motor lengths of 3.14 and 3.73 m. These are significant improvements over the original French
capability. From some images the length of the propellant grain and the nozzle can also be
separately estimated. (Table 9)
Table 9: Abdali Rocket Systems Measurements
Image Warhead + IF length Propellant grain Nozzle length Length (m)
Image 4 2.24 metres 2.52 metres 0.63 metres 5.38 metres
Image 5 2.83 metres 3.01 metres 0.72 metres 6.57 metres
7 There could be some errors in measurement of the rocket motor and nozzle lengths.
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These pictures also suggest that there have been improvements in the Abdali missile over time. If
the rocket motor is stretched by making it longer there is also a need to change the length of the
nosecone section because the stretch would alter the centre of gravity of the missile. The interface
would also become a bit longer.
Data available on the original French Dauphin8 missile indicate a nozzle length of around 1
metre. Both the Abdali variants as well as the original Hatf 1 from which the Abdali missiles may
have evolved have shorter nozzles.
These trends that we see in the images indicate that the agencies involved in the solid rocket
programmes within Pakistan have acquired the capabilities to modify and improve upon the
technologies they have gotten from other countries.
The Ghaznavi Missile
There are 7 images of the Ghaznavi missile that we were able to access. Of these images 3, 4 and
5 are reportedly images of the Ghaznavi launch of 29th November 2004. Images 6 and 7 are
images of the December 9th 2006 launch of the Ghaznavi. 4 images of the M11 were also analysed
to explore the technology links between them.
Image 1 of the Ghaznavi available in a semi-official Pakistani website shows the missile being
erected from its Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL).9 If the Ghaznavi is really an M11 variant,
the TEL which is used to carry and erect the missile must be a Chinese copy of the Russian MAZ
543 TEL whose dimensions are well known10. The image makes it feasible to measure the width
of the TEL. From the literature this width is known to be 3.02 metres. So if we can measure the
width with some accuracy we can use this measurement as a basis for independently measuring
the diameter of the missile and depending on the image we can extend this to getting reasonable
measurements on other missile parameters.11
8 As per Sud Aviation sources the dimensions of the Dauphin sounding rocket are given as 6.21 metres in length and 0.56 metres
in diameter. The 686 kg propellant Stromboli grain had a motor length of 2 metres. A variant of this with 740 kg of propellant
used as the 2nd stage of the Bernice (a re-entry study rocket) had a stage length of around 3.2 metres. This would imply that for
the 0.56 metres diameter rocket the nozzle length would be around 1 metre. Using the length of 6.21 metres this also implies that
the Dauphin rocket has a nosecone length of 3.2 metres.
9 See  http://www.pakistanidefence.com
10 Reports on the dimensions of the TEL for the SCUD series of missiles including the Scud B are widely available. Our analysis uses
this as a basis for many of the measurements made on the images. A Russian version of the MAZ 543 data is available http://
legion.wplus.net/guide/army/tr/maz543.shtml#R0. Another version (German) can be found in http://www.reserve-info.de/
aridat/scud.htm. Data can also be obtained from the Trembikta website in the Ukraine at http://www.trembikta.com.ua/eng/
auto/maz-53.html. There is also information available on Iraq's version of the TEL.
11 The dimensions we have used for calibration are the wheel base measures 2.2 metres : 3.3 metres: 2.2 metres (4 pairs of wheels
which are independently driven giving rise to 3 wheel bases), the diameter of the tyre reported to be 1.5 metres, the width of the
TEL reported to be 3.02 metres and the height of the TEL reported to be 3.03 metres. The length of the TEL varies depending on
the missile being carried.
57
The diameter of the Ghaznavi using the TEL width as the calibration standard works out to be
0.9085 metres close to the publicly quoted value of 0.88m. The diameter value is in reasonable
agreement with other assessments that relate the Ghaznavi to a Chinese solid rocket missile, the
M11,12 which in turn is based on the Soviet SCUD B missile whose diameter is known to be 0.88
metres.
If we use the publicly available value of 0.88 m for the diameter, the length works out to be 8.81
metres. The length of 8.81 seems to suggest that the 11.25 metre (SCUD B substitute) M11 length
was reduced by about 2.5 metres before it was exported to Pakistan. These measurements on the
first image are consistent with the Chinese origin of the Ghaznavi. The measurement on the
warhead part indicates a warhead length of approximately 3.76 m. By subtraction the rocket
motor stage length (propulsion + nozzle) works out to be approximately 5.05 metres.
The second image shows the Ghaznavi in flight13. Measurements indicate a Length to Diameter
(L/D) ratio of 10.13 which is in reasonable agreement with the first image. If the publicly available
value of the diameter is used (0.88 metres) the length works out to be 8.92 metres. The length of
the warhead + interface part works out to be 4.01 metres. The length of the rocket motor +
nozzle portion can be estimated as 4.91 metres.
Image 1 and image 2 are in reasonable agreement with each other. Evidence seems to suggest
that the warhead part of image 2 is longer by about 25 cm.14 Image 2 was also used to make an
estimate of the surface area of the fin using the TEL dimensions as the standard. The fin area
works out to be 0.471 sq. metres. Our liftoff calculations were refined using this value.
On November 29th 2004 Pakistan carried out a 3rd flight test of the Ghaznavi missile. 3 images of
the missile available in the public domain were analysed.15 Even though the quality of these images
was not very good we were still able to make some measurements on them. The L/D ratio from
these images of the November 29th 2004 launch ranged from 10.5 to about 11. Based on a diameter
of 0.88 metres this translates into an average length of 9.48 metres. The average rocket motor
length from the 3 images works out to be 5.17 metres and the average warhead length is
4.31 metres respectively.
12 Reports seem to suggest that the original M11 was designed as a more reliable missile that could compete with the Soviet SCUD
B in the export market. Once it became well known that the Chinese were exporting them to Pakistan, China apparently reduced
the length of the missile to be in compliance with the MTCR guideline of a range of 300 km with a 500 kg payload. Our estimates
suggest that the range of the Ghaznavi with a 500 kg payload exceeds the original MTCR limit.
13 Images 1 and 2 are from http://www.pakistanidefence.com
14 If a nuclear warhead replaces a conventional warhead since it is heavier some lengthening of the missile may be needed.
15 "Pakistan successfully test-fires Hatf-III Ghaznavi missile" Pak Tribune: Monday November 29, 2004, online edition of 30th
November 2004. http://www.paktribune.com/news index.php?PHPSESSID=8bed5ddbea402dd4c2177de36e4a09da&
c=&m=11&d=30&y=2004&hId=0&nw=0. Also see http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20041130/main6.htm.
58
The 4th launch of the Ghaznavi took place on December 9th 2006. One of the 2 available images of
this launch provided a reasonably accurate measurement opportunity.16 The L/D ratio of this
launch was 10.11 which translate into a missile length of 8.90 m. The length of the warhead was
4.1 m and the length of the rocket motor (including nozzle) was 4.80 m.
To explore the China connection a bit further we also used some publicly available images of the
M11 available in a semi-official website.17 Four images of the M11 being carried on their TEL are
available. This makes it easy to estimate the dimensions of the missile. Depending upon the image
various parts of the MAZ 543 TEL have been used for calibration. While length measurements
were possible for all the M11 images, an independent measure of the diameter could be made in
only one of the images. Warhead lengths could be measured in three of the images since the fins
were visible. In one case there were no fins visible to separate out the warhead portion.
Details of all Ghaznavi and M11 measurements are provided in Table 10.
Table 10: Ghaznavi & M11 Measurements
Length Diameter L /D Warhead
Image (m) (m) ratio  length Remarks
(m)
M 11 11.34 m N.A N.A N.A No No warhead fins seen
image 1 warhead fins
M 11 9.56 m N.A N.A 3.81 m Warhead fins seen. Can be
image 2 measured.
M 11 10.64 m N.A N.A 4.09 m Warhead fins seen
image 3
M 11 10.96 m 0.89 m 12.31 4.80 m Warhead fins can be seen.
image 4 estimate
Ghaznavi 8.81 m 0.91 m 10.01 3.80 m length and diameter based on
image 1 estimate TEL. Length 8.81 m based
on 0.88 m diameter
Ghaznavi 8.92 N.A 10.13 4.01 m Lengths based on 0.88
image 2
Ghaznavi 9.48 N.A 10.77 4.31 m Lengths based on 0.88
3rd launch
average
Ghaznavi 8.90 m N.A 10.11 4.1 m Lengths based on 0.88 m
4th launch diameter. Similar to Image 1,
Image 2.
16 See http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2006-12/09/content_754829.htm and http://mdn.mainichi-msn.co.jp/international/
news/20061209p2g00m0in012000c.html for images of the December 9th 2006 launch.
17 A number of images and briefs on various facets of the Chinese military and defence programmes are available on the net.
The images used are available at http://www.sinodefence.com/nuclear/df11.asp
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For images 2 and 3 of the Ghaznavi an independent measure of the diameter is not possible..
Lengths are estimated on assumed diameters of 0.88 m.
The independent measurements of the diameter from the 4th image of the M11 indicate a diameter
of 0.89 m. The other images were not suited for making an independent measurement of the
diameter.
It would appear from these measurements that the 0.88 m assumption for the diameter of the
M11 and the Ghaznavi quoted in the public domain is consistent with our analysis.
The available evidence from the images of the M11 seems to indicate that there are 3 warheads –
3.81 m, 4.09m and 4.80m. The measurements on the Ghaznavi missiles indicate warhead lengths
of 3.76 m., 4 to 4.1 m and 4.31 m. The dimensions of the Chinese shorter warheads closely fit the
warhead dimensions of the Ghaznavi missile.
There are also 3 incremental versions of the Chinese M 11 rocket motor with lengths of 5.76m,
6.17m and 6.54 m. The rocket motor lengths of the Ghaznavi missile as measured from the  images
are 5.05 m, 4.90 m, 5.17 m and 4.80 m indicating possibly two rocket motors with lengths of 4.80
to 4.90 m and 5 to 5.2 m respectively.
If we look at the shape and pattern of the Ghaznavi especially the warhead sections and the
various dimensions and ratios there is compelling evidence to indicate that the Chinese have
indeed supplied Pakistan with a shortened version of the shorter M11 variant. The warheads
match closely with Chinese warheads. We can conclude that
❏ The Ghaznavi is a shortened version of the shorter variant of the Chinese M11 missile.
❏ The Ghaznavi can carry two kinds of warheads. These may be a conventional warhead and
a nuclear warhead.18
❏ The warhead dimensions closely match warheads of the Chinese M11 missiles.
❏ The Chinese have however not transferred the longer version of their M11 missile nor the
later more advanced longer (4.80 m) version of their warhead.19
18 The measured differences between the warheads for both the M11 and the Ghaznavi do not appear to be large enough for us to
make the inference of a nuclear warhead. The Chinese M11 missiles do have nuclear warheads directed at Taiwan. This is clearly
seen in the longest warhead they have tested. The Ghaznavi stretch of the warhead by about 25 to 30 cms may indicate a nuclear
warhead. However, strategic considerations would suggest that Pakistan does indeed have capability to put a nuclear warhead
on the Ghaznavi. It is also possibly the most reliable of their missiles.
19 Public accounts of the M11 such as those found in the FAS website as well as other sources talk of a conventional warhead, a
nuclear warhead and an improved warhead with nozzle control. See http://www.fas.org./nuke/guide/china/theater/df-11.html.
These are also talked about by other sources http://www.sinodefence.com/nuclear/df11.asp
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The public evidence is consistent with the Chinese transfer of a shortened version of the shorter
variant of the M 11 missile to Pakistan. This version, which the Pakistanis call as the Ghaznavi,
has a length of between 8.8 to 9.5 metres and a diameter of 0.88 m. The Ghaznavi can carry two
warheads a warhead about 3.76 to 4 metres long or a longer warhead with a length of approximately
4.31 metres. The warhead dimensions as well as the general shape of the warheads closely match
the warheads of the M11. The observed evidence is consistent with the Chinese origins of the
Ghaznavi missile.
The Ghauri Missile
We looked at 16 images of the Ghauri for our study. Some of the images were not suitable for
making accurate measurements. Table 4 in the main text summarises the measurements on the
images that we used.
If we look at the images of the first launch20 (images 1 and 2) the L/D ratios of 11.29 and 11.11
are reasonably close. We can make the inference that the first launch did have an L/D ratio of
approximately 11.29.
There are two images of the April 1999 launch (image 321 and image 422). Image 3 has an L/D
ratio of 11.23 and image 4 has an L/D ratio of 12.48. Image 4 taken from a newspaper source on
the day following the launch, is likely to be more authentic.
Image 3 which has a white band as a differentiator has an overall length and L/D ratio very close
to that of Image 1. A closer look at the nosecone (red band) measurement would however seem
to suggest that Image 1 and Image 3 are images of different launches.
Image 523  supposed to be the Ghauri launch of May 2002, has an L/D ratio of 12.48. As we can
see from Table 4 its other measured parameters closely match that of Image 4. Its differentiating
feature from Image 4 is a white band below the nosecone. Based on the measurements there is a
fairly strong case for believing that Image 4 and Image 5 are the same image of the same launch.
Image 624 is presumed to be an image of the May 2004 launch of the Ghauri. It has an L/D ratio
of 11.26. On blowing up the image it looks as though this is a doctored image. There seems to be
20 Both images are from http://www.pakistanidefence.com
21 Source: http://www.pakistanidefence.com
22 See the newspaper Pak Tribune at http://www.tribuneindia.com/1999/99apr15/head4.htm
23 Taken from  http://www.pakistanpage.net/gallery/main/n/npak.html
24 This image is taken from http://www.pakistanpage.net/gallery/main/n/npak.html
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a white strip pasted on to the image. A plausible hypothesis is that an image of an earlier launch
has been altered. We see from Table 4 that Image 1 has almost the same values as Image 6. It
appears that a white strip has been pasted on to Image 1 in order to get Image 6. If a launch did
take place successfully one would assume that an image would have been available. This does
raise the issue as to whether the launch was successful.
Images 725, 826 and 927 are all related to the Ghauri launch of October 12th 2004. Image 7 from the
Pakistanidefence.com site gives an L/D ratio of 11.31 which is close to the L/D ratio of the first
Ghauri flight (Image 1). It has a white band below the red nosecone.  Images 8 and 9 from the
Tribune and Al Jazeera give L/D ratios of 12.64 and 12.51. These are consistent with each other.
Both of them have white bands and though their measurements are close to images 4 and 5 on
balance there are sufficient differences to infer that the October 12th 2004 flight did take place
and the L/D ratio of the Ghauri launch on this date was between 12.51 and 12.64.
Images of the Ghauri in flight do not allow us to make independent measurements of various
parameters of interest such as the length of the missile, the diameter of the missile or the length of
the warhead. Images 10 and 11 are images of the Ghauri being readied for launch. People and
parts of the TEL28 used for launching can be seen in these pictures. These can be used in our study
to see whether we could use them to get an independent measure of the diameter of the Ghauri
missile.
Image 1029 (L/D of 10.83) has people present reasonably close to the missile. Assuming some
typical values of the height of a person we can estimate the length and diameter of the missile.
Based on an average height of a person as 1.73 metres, the length of the missile works out to be
16 metres and the diameter 1.5 metres.30 For all reasonable values of the height of the person the
diameter measurements are much larger than what is reported in the published information. On
technical considerations it is unlikely that the diameter will exceed 1.3 metres. The L/D value is
also not in agreement with the flight images of the Ghauri.
25 Taken from http://www.pakistanidefence.com
26 The Pak Tribune newspaper at http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.php?id=80137
27 http://www.aljazeera.com/cgi-bin/news_service/middle_east_full_story.asp?service_ID=5095
28 Unlike in the case of the M11 where there is sufficient public knowledge on the TEL there is not public material on the
Ghauri / No Dong TEL. This makes possible only the use of TEL independent objects in the image to make independent
measurements.
29 This image is available at  http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE5-4/arya.html. It is reported to have taken from
the FAS website.
30 In a similar analysis   David Wright in his article on the Ghauri reports a diameter value of 1.5 metres based on a reported length
of 17 metres. He also questions the authenticity of the data source. See footnote 17, David C. Wright "An Analysis of the Pakistani
Ghauri Missile Test of April 6, 1998", Science and Global Security 1998, Volume 7, pp 227-236.
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For Image 1131 the L/D ratio of 10.89 is consistent with the L/D ratio of Image 10. Independent
estimates of the diameter made from the image give values of the diameter that are much larger
than the 1.3 m diameter that one should expect.
One possible explanation for the differences we see in these 2 images may be that they are dummy
missiles used to train the troops. There is a practice of the Chinese doing training exercises with
dummy missiles during the early days of their programme. Possibly what we are seeing here is
also something similar.
On November 16th 2006 Pakistan launched another Ghauri missile.32 With an L/D ratio of 12.33
(Image 16) the length of this missile can be estimated as 16.03 m. Though slightly shorter this
matches reasonably well with images 4, 5, 8 and 9.
Based on the measurements we can conclude that the 2 configurations of the Ghauri missile have
lengths of 14.6 to 14.7 m and 16 to 16.4 m. These 2 configurations use the same booster but have
different warheads. The shorter configuration could carry a conventional warhead and the longer
configuration could carry a nuclear warhead.
The Shaheen 1 Missile
12 images of the Shaheen 1 and 6 images of the M9 missiles were analysed. The measurements
are summarized in Table 5 of the main text. Some important details on the images are provided in
Table 11 below.
Table 11: Details of the various Shaheen 1 and M9 Images
Image Comment
Shaheen Image 1 This is a missile shown in a parade. The TEL is a MAZ 543 Soviet TEL derivative.
The diameter based on the TEL wheel base is close to 1 metre. Consistent
with public information
Shaheen Image 2 This is also an image of a missile shown on a launch pad. Possibly an early
version with a dummy warhead
Shaheen Image 3 Another image of the Shaheen on the launch pad. Same image as image 2
different source
Shaheen Image 4 This is reported to be an image of the flight in October 2003 as per the Daily
Times a Pakistani paper. It is possibly one of the earliest Shaheen flights with
a dummy warhead. Compatible with images 1, 2 and 3.
31 http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE5-4/arya.html
32 See http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/NewsEventImagePopUp.aspx?ImageID=224  and http://www.spacewar.com/
reports/Pakistan_Fires_Nuclear_Capable_Missile_999.html for images of this launch.
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Image Comment
Shaheen Image 5 Image from CNN reporting the launch of the Shaheen 2 stage missile on 9th
March 2004. The image is of course an earlier Shaheen 1 flight.
Shaheen Image 6 October 8th 2003 launch of the Shaheen 1. This is the 4th launch. Longer
warhead, longer rocket motor compatible with a nuclear warhead. Fits testing
sequence.
Shaheen Image 7 Shaheen 1 October 8th 2002 launch. Compatible with image 5. Conventional
warhead launch.
Shaheen Image 8 October 8th 2003 launch . Compatible with image 6. Nuclear warhead longer
rocket motor?
Shaheen Image 23 November 29th 2006 launch
Image 9 M9 A TEL wheel base of 1.35 m is compatible with a 1 m diameter rocket. Warhead
compatible with conventional warhead of the Shaheen. Shaheen 1 bigger
rocket than M9
Image 10 M9 This is a image of an M9  being readied for launch. The TEL is looks like a
Soviet /Ukrainian MAZ 543 TEL. Wheel base or tyre diameter gives missile
diameter as 1.02 –1.12 m. On balance diameter of 1 m validated
Image 11 M9 Looks like a stretched version of the original M9. The warhead part bigger
than the rocket motor. A new advanced warhead? The TEL is not the MAZ but
a new TEL.
Image 12 M9 Image of a take off from a TEL. Diameter based on the MAZ width works out
to be 1.07 m
Image 13 M9 Launch image
The first 3 images (Image 1, Image 2 and Image 3) are images of the Shaheen on parade (Image
1) and images of the Shaheen being readied for launch (Images 2 & 3) from two different sources.33
Image 134 (a 1999 image showing the Shaheen mounted on a TEL during a parade) can be used
to independently assess the diameter of the missile since the TEL on which the Shaheen is carried
is a modified version of the Soviet MAZ 543 TEL. While there are some problems with a clear
measurement,35 the diameter estimates are close to the publicly known value of 1 metre.36
Images 237 and 338 which are images of the missile (the same image from different sources) being
readied for launch helps us to get some idea of the warhead and rocket motor lengths. Assuming
the diameter of the missile as 1 metre we can convert measured values of these parameters into
lengths. These measurements on images 2 and 3 are compatible with each other and quite close
to the length determined from image 1.
33 These are the same image being taken from 2 different sources.
34 Source:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2534731.stm
35 Though the quality of the image is very good a precise measurement of the diameter is difficult because     there is no clear
separation of the missile from the TEL.





The 4th image is also very similar to images 2 and 3 but shows the missile in flight.39 Though the
source from which the image is taken seems to suggest that it is an image of one of the Shaheen
flights of October 2003, it is most probably an image of one of the early flights of the Shaheen 1.
The tilt of the image is such that we would expect some underestimate of the length. This seems
to be an early flight of the Shaheen 1 with a dummy payload. It very closely resembles Images 2
and 3 – though visual inspection clearly shows it is a different missile.
Images 1, 2, 3 and 4 are compatible with a 9.9 metre long, 1 metre diameter Shaheen missile. It is
also compatible with the logic of a dummy warhead being tested on initial launches of missiles.
Image 540 is taken from a report on the Shaheen 2 two-stage missile test of 9th March 2004. It is
obviously an image of an earlier Shaheen 1 flight. The various parameters derived from this
image (L/D ratio, length based on a diameter of 1 metre, warhead length, rocket motor  length)
are quite close to that of Image 7.
Image 741 is reported to be a picture of the 3rd launch of the Shaheen that took place on October
8th 2002. It appears to be a Shaheen 1 with a shorter conventional payload.
Images 642 and 843 have L/D ratios of 12.69 and 12.83 respectively. Both of them are supposedly
images of the same launch – the 4th Shaheen launch of October 8th 2003. Since it is the 4th launch
it is quite likely that the launch would carry a nuclear warhead. The evidence and the timing are
also consistent with the desired sequence of testing.44
This means that there are 2 variants of the Shaheen missile. Variant 1 is a missile that carries a
conventional warhead (length 11.4 to 11.6 m, diameter 1 metre, warhead length 4.25 to 4.45
metres, rocket motor length of 7.1 to 7.2 metres45). Variant 2 has a longer (heavier) nuclear
payload. It has a length of between 12.7 to 12.8 metres, a diameter of 1 metre, a warhead of 4.8




42 Source: www.globeandmail.com/.../ BNStory/International/
43 Source:http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4483834/
44 The sequence typically followed would be a dummy payload followed by a conventional payload followed by a simulated nuclear
payload.
45 The rocket motor length measurement includes the nozzle and any other interface.
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The Shaheen 1 was again tested on November 29th, 2006.  There are three different images of the
same launch – one from the Hindu newspaper46 and two images from a Chinese newspaper, the
China Daily.47 We made measurements on all the 3 images.
Based on the measurements we came to the conclusion that the Hindu image represents one
configuration of the Shaheen we have already seen being tested.
The China Daily has two separate images purporting to be the Shaheen 1 missile launched of
29th November 2006. One has a warhead length of 4.69 m and a rocket motor + nozzle + fin
length of 6.55 m. It represents a combination of an earlier rocket motor with an existing warhead.
The other China Daily picture shows a warhead length of 4.75 m and a rocket motor + nozzle +
fin length of 7.45 m. The length of this version would be 12.2 m. This seems to be a new
configuration of an existing warhead with a new rocket motor. Our view is that this is the
most likely configuration that was flown.
Images 9, 10, 11 and 12 are of the Chinese M9 missile. Images 10 and 12 are images of the launch
of the missile from a mobile MAZ 543 derived TEL. Images 9 and 11 are pictures of the M9 being
carried on a Chinese built TEL.
Images 9, 10 and 12 have lengths ranging from 8.4 to 8.9 metres. These differences are due to
differing warheads (conventional warhead and a nuclear warhead) with some differences in
rocket motor dimensions too. Image 11 has a length that is greater by nearly 1 metre – 9.69
metres. This could be a stretched version of the M9 with a more advanced nuclear payload.48
Images 10 and 12 are carried on a MAZ 543 derived TEL. The diameter measurements based on
a tyre diameter of 1.5 metres gives a missile diameter very close to 1 metre.49
Images 9 and 11 do not use the MAZ TEL but another version of the TEL which seems to have a
shorter wheel base and a smaller diameter tyre. A wheel base of about 1.35 metres and a tyre
diameter of about 1.05 metres would be compatible with a 1 metre diameter M9 missile.50
46 http://www.hindu.com/2006/11/30/stories/2006113001891400.htm
47 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2006-11/29/content_746307_2.htm and http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2006-11/
29/content_746307.htm
48 The D15 A is supposed to have a more advanced and more accurate nuclear warhead. See http://www.softwar.net/df15.html.
Also see http://www.sinodefence.com/nuclear/df15.asp for the sources of the images.
49 Values obtained using the tyre diameter for Image 10 and the width of the TEL for image 12 were 1.03 and 1.07 m. If wheel base
measurements were used these values changed somewhat. These would change depending on where the standard is located and
where on the image the measurement is made.
50 If we assume a diameter of 1 metre we can work out the other measurements.
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Though there are references in the literature to the German origins of the Chinese TEL or to the
TEL being based on a Mercedes Benz or Iveco technology.51 The Chinese TELs seem to be different.
Their version resembles the MAZ 543 in outward shape with the dimensions being different. The
TELs on which later M9 missiles are carried is also a Chinese made TEL.52
When we compare the Shaheen 1 and the M9 missiles it is clear that one of the most important
parameters the diameter is the same for both. However, the lengths of the missiles are very different.
The Pakistani Shaheens are longer missiles with a longer range. There are also similarities in
terms of warhead dimensions. One can argue that in theory that if designs were based on similar
principles and assumptions one would end up with similar designs. If however one looks at the
pictures of the warhead portion of the missiles we see very great similarities. If this similarity is
linked with the known connection between Pakistan and China regarding the Ghaznavi and the
M11 link, the case for Chinese help and technology in the case of the Shaheen is quite strong.
This connection should however not blind us to certain facts. The Pakistanis have a fairly long
history of working on solid rocket propulsion technologies. They have benefited from early help
for sounding rocket production from the French. The recent spate of launches of the Shaheen 1
and the launch of the 2-stage Shaheen 2 is evidence of good capabilities for the development and
production of solid rockets and missiles.
The sequence of testing visible from the images of the Shaheen 1 seems to show the transition
from a dummy warhead to a conventional warhead to a nuclear warhead. This sequence for the
Shaheen1 is quite different from the sequence we see in the Ghaznavi.53 The Shaheen programme
is obviously much more than just technology transfer or licensed production. There are 4 rocket
motors for 3 warheads visible in the 6 proven flights out of 7 launches reported. They are also
longer rockets than the M9.54 While one can argue that this is not conclusive to make clear
inferences on indigenous capability it does appear very plausible that the Pakistanis have indeed
internalized much of the technology. The programme may have gained from the Chinese especially
in the warhead parts of the technology and maybe even in some areas like control and guidance
51 http://www.aeronautics.ru/archive/wmd/ballistic/ballistic/css6-01.htm
52 The Taian 5380 heavy duty vehicle is the base for the M9 TELs. For some details see http://www.sinodefence.com/army/
transport/tas5380.asp. There is also known transfer of MAZ 543 TEL technology from Ukraine to the Chinese.
53 Of course the Ghaznavi launches are only 4 in number and we have only a few  images of flights.
54 We can see from the parameters that the M9 missiles openly displayed by the Chinese are shorter than the Shaheen 1. Their range
with a 1000 kg to 700 kg payload  is between 224 and 308 km. This is lower than the range of the smaller diameter (0.88 m) M11
missile. This is a strange development leading to the logical conclusion that the M9 was originally designed to be a bigger missile
and that it has been cut short intentionally. This could also account for the longer length of the Shaheen missile as being close
to the original M9 length. There are reports that the M9 we are seeing is the 1st stage of a larger 2-stage M18 missile. There is
some logic for this. Reports indicate that it is deployed with a 500 kg tactical nuclear payload directed at Taiwan.
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technologies.55 However, the programme today appears to be robust and strong with the capability
to produce Shaheen missiles in reasonable numbers. It also appears to be a much more open and
transparent capability than the capabilities in liquid propulsion as seen in the Ghauri missile.56
This openness could be intentional and part of a new doctrine of letting the world know that
Pakistan is certainly capable of protecting itself.
The Shaheen 2
There are 8 images of the Shaheen 2 that were available. All 8 images were analysed.
The first launch of the two stage Shaheen missile took place on March 9th 2004. Subsequent
launches took place on March 19th 2005 and April 29th 2006.
Images of the 1st launch were put out after the launch by the Pakistani press. An image available
in the public domain (Image 15) was used for our analysis.57A TEL that helped launch the missile
is clearly visible in the image. This image is such that no independent verification of its diameter
or length is feasible even though a TEL is visible.58
The second launch of the Shaheen 2 took place on March 19th 2005. Three images of the Shaheen
flights were available for analysis. Two images59 (images 16, 18) showed the rocket on the launch
pad before liftoff with President Musharaff being present. The other image60 (image 17) shows
the Shaheen in flight. Visual observations coupled with measurements confirm that the 3 images
(Image 16, 17 18) are of the same rocket. The measurements confirm that this launch is similar
to the Shaheen 2 flown on March 10th 2004.
The 3rd launch of the Shaheen 2 took place on April 29th 2006. 4 images of this launch were
available.61 Two of these images provided us useful measurements.
55 One source suggests that the impact point of the warhead and the reentry point of the rocket are separated by 40 to 50 km. This
suggests separation and may be spin up of the warhead at some point prior to reentry. See http://www.kokaniz.com/shaheen.htm
for a report on the Shaheen development by Hanif Khalid. This is apparently taken from the Rawalpindi paper Jang 19 April
1999 page 10.
56 Maybe Pakistan wants the world as well as India to know what it has. There seems to be a proactive planned strategy of
disseminating information. See the part on the Ghauri missile.
57 See http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_10-3-2004_pg1_1
58 The TEL resembles an MAZ 543 though it is not very clear
59 http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/050319/481/kar10303191403 and http://www.paktribune.com/news/
index.php?id=98371
60 http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story2&u=/050319/photos_wl/mdf900669&e=12&ncid=708
61 See http://news.monstersandcritics.com/southasia/news/article_1159371.php, http://www.app.com.pk, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/29/world/main1561478.shtml?source=RSS&attr=World_1561478
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Table 11 below provides details of the various usable measurements made on the Shaheen 2
images. The dimensions are based on the assumption that the diameter of the missile is 1 metre.
Table 11: Measurements on the Shaheen 2 Missile
Parameter Image 15 Image 16 Image 17 Image 18 Image 20 Image 24
March 2004  March 2005  March 2005  March 2005 April  2006 April 2006
L/D ratio 11.88 12.18 12.05 12 12.68 12.45
Length 11.88 m 12.18 m 12.05 m 12 m 12.68 m 12.45 m
Warhead + if 3.18 m 3 m 3.2 m 3.04 m 3.38 m 3.32 m
Stage 2 grain 2.18 m 2.36 m 2.25 m 2.08 m 2.18 m 2.14 m
Stage 2 total 3.53 m 3.72 m 3.45 m 3.54 m 3.65 m 3.59 m
Stage 1 grain 4.36 m 4.27 m 4.45 m 4.41 m 4.56 m 4.5 m
Stage 1 total 5.18 m 5.45 m 5.40 m 5.41 m 5.65 m 5.54 m
Diameter 1 m 1 m 1 m 1 m 1 m 1 m
The first two launches of the Shaheen 2 appear to be very similar from the data in Table 6. The
3rd launch of the Shaheen 2 seems to be a slightly stretched version. This trend seen in conjunction
with other trends we have seen for the Shaheen 1 and the Abdali point to an increasingly
sophisticated and customized system engineering capability.
With a larger Shaheen 1 booster stage being available, Pakistan can also develop a variant of the
Shaheen 2 that would increase the range and bring a large part of India within the ambit of a
Pakistani missile.
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